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FOREwORd 
When it started nesta’s Creative Credits project looked like a brave but isolated 
experiment. there had been remarkably little use of rigorous experiment design in 
industrial policy, innovation policy and the arts. at worst some governments evaluated their 
policies by surveying grant recipients to ask whether they had found the grants useful.
now things look rather different. since the project was carried out there has been 
a resurgence of interest in the rigorous use of evidence and in the use of properly 
constituted control groups. at nesta we have launched the alliance for useful evidence  
which has both benefited from, and contributed to, renewed enthusiasm for measurement 
and rigour in public policy. the uK government has started to raise its game, building on 
the success of niCe in healthcare with a batch of new ‘What Works’ centres (though so far 
these have been mainly focused on social policy rather than business). there’s also growing 
interest in international organisations, and the european Commission.
vast amounts of public money are spent supporting businesses around the world. much 
of this may do good – helping firms to adopt new technologies or to sharpen up their 
strategies or marketing. But the truth is that nobody knows whether it’s having any real 
impact. officials don’t know. ministers don’t know. and the businesses themselves don’t 
know.
they don’t know because, in stark contrast with fields like medicine, new approaches are 
introduced without testing.
the Creative Credits project should be seen as a pioneer. We will be following it up with 
new initiatives to support intelligent experimentation and measurement in innovation 
policy.
my hope is that before long it will be obvious that any new programme should be tested 
before it’s taken to scale. that way we’ll get smarter, more effective policies. But we may 
also save a great deal of money too...
Geoff mulgan 
Chief executive of nesta.
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ExECuTIvE SummARy 
very little policy supporting business is subjected to rigorous evaluation. As a result we 
have no reliable way of knowing if large sums of public money are being wasted. Creative 
Credits – the focus of this report – is an important innovation in itself: it helps smaller 
firms become more competitive by connecting them with creative businesses. 
But the evaluation method used may be even more important, since it not only 
uses randomization to establish the scheme’s additional impact, but also links that 
to longitudinal data collection which is vital in helping to assess the longer term 
effectiveness of different policy tools. This is an approach that should be applied much 
more widely. At a time when public resources are scarce it’s more important than ever 
that we find out what works and what doesn’t – and that principle should apply as much 
to business support as it does to programmes in healthcare or schools, where the uK 
Government has so far shown much greater interest.
this report uses a randomized controlled trial methodology to evaluate a business support 
scheme called Creative Credits. Creative Credits is a business–to–business voucher 
mechanism designed to encourage small and medium–sized enterprises (smes) to innovate 
in partnership with creative service providers. in the pilot in the manchester City region 
in the north West of england in 2009 and 2010, smes received Creative Credits worth 
£4,000, which they could use to purchase a variety of creative services from local creative 
businesses. the smes were required to contribute at least a further £1,000 of their own 
towards their projects. this report evaluates the impact of the pilot.
previous research has suggested that creative businesses, as a source of new ideas and 
knowledge, exert positive influences on innovation in other firms they are transacting with. 
For a wide range of innovation measures, firms with stronger links to the creative industries 
appear to have a superior innovation performance. a uK study combining survey measures 
of innovation with the input–output tables that quantify supply chain links between 
sectors finds that firms that spend double the average amount on creative inputs – 6 per 
cent compared with three per cent of their gross output – are 25 per cent more likely to 
introduce product innovations.
such findings are indicative at best, as they cannot rule out that the causality runs in the 
opposite direction. that is, that more innovative businesses have a tendency to make 
greater use of creative services. in the Creative Credits pilot, the random assignment of 
smes to the treatment and control groups meant that we were able to explore the causal 
relationship between the use of creative services and innovation with a much greater 
degree of statistical robustness than would otherwise have been possible.
We found that Creative Credits created genuinely new relationships between smes and 
creative businesses, with the award of a Creative Credit increasing the likelihood that firms 
would undertake an innovation project with a creative business they had not previously 
worked with by at least 84 per cent (table a, where the dependent variable takes the value 
of one for firms that proceeded with their project and zero otherwise, and the ‘Creative 
Credit’ variable takes the value of one for firms that received a Creative Credit and zero if 
they did not).
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dependent variable: whether or not firms undertook their project 
Number of observations 451
Adjusted R–squared 0.653 
variable   Coefficient   Std. Err.   t–statistic  Signif.
Creative  0.840  0.028   29.11***  0.000 
Credit 
Constant  0.119  0.017   7.18***  0.000 
term
Table A: likelihood of firms undertaking their innovation project
Notes: analysis is based on respondents to the initial baseline survey undertaken immediately after the allocation 
of Creative Credits. *** denotes significance at the 1 per cent level.
the evidence also supports the view that working with creative businesses can lead firms 
to be more innovative: in the six months following completion of their creative projects, 
smes were significantly more likely than those that were not assigned Creative Credits to 
have introduced product and process innovations (table B, part a). the use of creative 
services also had a statistically significant positive effect on the sales growth of smes 
over the same period. these findings provide striking evidence that working with creative 
businesses can generate commercial benefits for smes.
twelve months after the completion of the Creative Credits project, however, there was no 
longer a statistically significant difference between the treatment and control groups in the 
proportion of firms innovating, nor in their sales growth, in the previous six months. (table 
B, part B). though only a minority of smes at this point reported having received the full 
benefits from their projects.
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  Control Treatment t–statistic Signif. 
 N % firms % firms
A. After 6 months
Product or service 
innovation 145/105 55.9 72.4 2.740*** 0.007
New to the market  
innovation 126/92 23.0 35.9 2.089** 0.038
Process innovation 142/105 47.2 63.8 2.618*** 0.009
  Control Treatment χ2(6) Signif. 
 N % firms % firms
Average sales  
growth 146/107 6.4 7.5 11.5* 0.075
  Control Treatment t–statistic Signif. 
 N % firms % firms
B. After 12 months
Product or service 
innovation 154/113 63.0 70.8 1.345 0.180
New to the market  
innovation 135/97 32.6 40.2 1.192 0.235
Process innovation 153/111 51.0 47.7 0.517 0.606
  Control Treatment χ2(6) Signif. 
 N % firms % firms
Average sales  
growth 155/114 4.7 7.8 7.7 0.261
Table B: output additionality in terms of the probability of innovation: 6 months  
 and 12 months after the completion of the Creative Credits projects
Notes: table is based on the longitudinal sample. see annex 1 for details. after six months, firms were asked 
to select a band within which their sales had grown/fallen in the previous six months and whether they had 
introduced any innovations in the previous six months. after twelve months, firms were again asked to choose a 
band within which their sales had grown/fallen in the previous six months and whether they had introduced any 
innovations in the previous six months. differences in response numbers between questions and between 6 and 
12 months reflect those respondents not answering particular questions and those selecting the (‘don’t know’) 
response. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. the χ2(6) 
test statistic is based on the difference in distribution of sales growth rates, not the average sales growth rates. 
the number of degrees of freedom in this test is determined by the banding of the sales growth data.
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there was no evidence either that Creative Credits had had a permanent effect on the 
behaviour of smes: for example, those receiving Creative Credits appeared no more likely 
to work with creative service businesses in the longer term. 
the qualitative research suggests that for many smes where the short-term benefits were 
not sustained, the creative projects had been too ‘transactional’ in nature, and for others 
there had been communication difficulties with their creative partners. this suggests that 
future versions of the scheme which seek to sustain longer term benefits should explore 
opportunities for targeted brokerage to support the relationship between smes and their 
creative suppliers. any such modifications should be similarly rigorously evaluated.
the evaluation approach that we adopted in this project combined three elements – 
randomized allocation of Creative Credits, longitudinal data collection, and the use of 
mixed methods. this has proven to be a powerful methodology, and we argue that it 
should be used much more widely by the Government and other agencies in developing 
new innovation support policies.
We note that a number of cities across europe are now adopting their own Creative 
Credits–style schemes e.g. strasbourg, salzburg, sligo and the Basque Country, inspired by 
the successes of the manchester pilot. the uK Government is more generally showing an 
appetite for innovation voucher schemes. Concurring with a study of innovation support 
schemes for manufacturing smes published last year by the european Commission, we 
advise strongly that these (and other innovation support) schemes should adhere wherever 
possible to a randomized allocation as they are rolled out, in order to establish a cumulative 
evidence base for the effectiveness of their programme design features.
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Section 1: 
CREATIvE ExPERImENTATION
this report brings together two very recent developments in policymakers’ understanding 
of innovation. First, the recognition that the creative industries are an innovative sector that 
can stimulate innovation in other sectors too, through their supply chain linkages. second, 
the argument that innovation policymakers should make use of controlled experimentation 
methods to trial and test new policy interventions.
there is a growing body of evidence that creative businesses in sectors like software, 
architecture and advertising tend to introduce product and process innovations at a higher 
frequency than other sectors of the economy.1 Furthermore, as a source of new ideas 
and knowledge, they may exert positive influences on innovation in other firms they are 
transacting with. previous nesta research suggests that for a wide range of innovation 
measures, firms with stronger links to the creative industries have a superior innovation 
performance. For example, firms that spend double the average amount on creative 
products – 6 per cent compared with 3 per cent of their gross output – are 25 per cent 
more likely to introduce product innovations. to put this into context, these effects are in 
quantitative terms equivalent to the impacts that national innovation support policies are 
estimated to have had on innovation.
a separate literature emphasises that uncertainty about future opportunities and 
constraints can be a great barrier to business innovation.2 innovation policy, it is argued, 
should aim to reduce this uncertainty, by enabling experimental learning. that is, the goals 
of innovation policy need to be led by research and learning priorities. Control groups 
of businesses should be tracked, in order to identify the impact of support measures on 
business change as well as the mechanisms by which this change is affected. policymakers 
should stand ready to scale up or down the experimental inquiry, perhaps significantly, 
depending on emerging findings.3 this argument lends itself to a more ‘project–based’ 
conception of industrial policy.
in 2009, researchers at nesta devised an ‘industrial policy experiment’ to explore these 
arguments further. this report, and the research on which it is based, makes three original 
contributions. For the first time, it provides robust quantitative evidence at the firm level 
on the causal – as opposed to merely correlative – relationship between business use 
of creative services and innovation (and, as such, contributes to the so–called creative 
industries ‘spillovers’ agenda4). second, it employs a randomized controlled trial (rCt) 
experimental methodology to evaluate the scheme’s additional short and longer term 
impacts on business innovation – a rare example of the use of the rCt method in industrial 
policy. lastly, it embeds the rCt in a wider ranging mixed–method evaluation which makes 
use of qualitative methods to probe the results from the quantitative analysis. as such, 
it points to a new way that the impact of policies to support business innovation can be 
rigorously evaluated, one we term ‘rCt+’.
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Section 2: 
CREATIvITy, OPEN INNOvATION 
ANd GROwTh
Key points:
previous studies suggest that partnering with other organizations – through an ‘open’ 
innovation strategy – can make firms more innovative, and that innovation in turn 
contributes to enhanced business performance. 
other studies suggest that creativity and design also stimulate business innovation, 
but that a range of difficulties around communication, goal orientation and aspiration 
gaps between creative staff and others involved in the innovation process can 
present barriers.
levels of openness and innovation in small– and medium–sized enterprises (smes) 
may further be hindered by behavioural failures in their managers, linked to inertia, 
risk aversion and myopia. these behavioural failures are likely to lead to levels of 
openness and innovation which are below what is socially desirable, a factor which 
has motivated a range of innovation voucher schemes which have attempted to 
‘nudge’ smes into being more innovative by connecting them with universities. 
the Creative Credits scheme intends to overcome behavioural failures and build 
new partnerships between smes and creative service providers and so stimulate 
innovation and organizational learning. 
2.1 Introduction 
previous research has established positive relationships between innovation and growth, 
and, separately, creativity and innovation. in this section, we briefly review this evidence, 
which provides the broader context for the Creative Credits scheme. We emphasise the 
challenges that smes in particular face in undertaking open innovation, and discuss some 
of the policy responses which have been adopted. 
section 2.2 reviews the evidence on the relationship between open innovation and business 
performance. open innovation involves working with partners, whether customers, 
suppliers or other organizations, to generate new products or services. recent evidence 
suggests that open innovation is becoming more widespread amongst smes.5
However, as other research has made clear, open innovation poses particular challenges for 
smes because of their lack of capacity to both seek and absorb external knowledge when 
compared with larger firms.6 
12   CREaTiVE CREDiTS  a randomized controlled industrial policy experiment
section 2.3 considers some recent evidence on the relationship between creativity and 
innovation, with a particular focus on the value to firms’ innovation processes of accessing 
external creative services through suppliers. again, we might anticipate that smes 
face particular issues in working with external creative service providers due to limited 
absorptive capacity and/or internal resources, though the existing evidence base for this 
is much weaker. these issues are discussed in section 2.4 along with some possible policy 
responses.
2.2 Open innovation and business performance
a growing body of evidence suggests that collaborating with external partners on 
innovation (or ‘openness’) may influence the performance of firms in a number of ways, 
through stimulating creativity, enhancing product quality and providing reputational 
benefits which signal the quality of firms’ innovation activities.7 external linkages may 
also provide access to networks which create commercial opportunities, and allow 
firms to search their technological environment in a more systematic fashion, resulting 
in improved access to technology developed elsewhere.8 Because the success of any 
innovation process is uncertain, firms may have an incentive to pursue several such external 
linkages at the same time: having more linkages or different types of linkage spreads 
the risks of innovation on the one hand, and increases the probability of obtaining useful 
knowledge from outside of the firm on the other.9 Furthermore, there is empirical evidence 
that knowledge gained from different sources tends to be complementary, and also 
complementary with respect to internal r&d in shaping innovation performance.10
using external knowledge linkages, however, also has potential disadvantages, both for 
large and small firms. Firms may, for example, face difficulties in defending their intellectual 
property rights in relationships with partners, which may limit the commercial benefits 
from collaborating. Furthermore, sourcing information from, or collaborating with, a larger 
number or variety of partners raises search, management and monitoring costs.
absorbing knowledge simultaneously from a large number of sources can be challenging 
too.11 there may, for example, be limits to how much attention managers can give to, and 
cognitively process, competing sources of information. the returns to adding linkages are 
therefore likely to be diminishing, and may even turn negative beyond some ‘saturation’ 
point. 
as a consequence of these trade–offs, some studies detect an ‘inverted u–shaped’ 
relationship between the breadth of external knowledge linkages (that is, the number of 
different types of knowledge linkage) and innovation performance.12 
a robust research finding is that innovative firms are more profitable.13 this may be because 
innovators are able – at least for a time – to enjoy monopoly profits while their intellectual 
property is protected, or alternatively it may be because innovating firms have a tendency 
to introduce successive innovations over time, and are therefore able to sustain high profits, 
even if the profits from any one innovation are transitory. 
studies also provide clear evidence of the positive relationship between innovation and 
firm productivity,14 and innovation and business growth in a range of sectors.15 a recent 
study from the uK, for example, provides evidence of the positive impact of innovation 
on growth in a sample of business services firms (as well as the impact of openness on 
innovation itself16).
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the evidence on the effect of openness on innovation and business performance is 
important for the Creative Credits experiment, in that it points to the potential impacts 
we might observe. if Creative Credits succeeds in stimulating firms to develop the extent 
of their collaborative relationships with innovative businesses (pointing to the notion of 
‘network additionality’ in which a policy intervention helps or encourages a firm to extend 
its innovation networks17) we might expect to see increased innovation and improved 
business performance (‘output additionality’).
However, network and output additionality are not the only beneficial effects which 
might be anticipated from Creative Credits.18 undertaking innovation projects can also 
have other capability or learning benefits for firms, which are best described under the 
heading of ‘behavioural additionality’. this captures the extent to which the behaviour of 
a firm’s managers changes as a result of an innovation project.19 Behavioural additionality 
might relate broadly to technological activities (firms may explore new technological or 
market opportunities after contact with a new technology or market area, for example), 
processes (firms may develop new coordinating systems for r&d and innovation, either 
in–house or for managing or developing external links), and people (firms may develop 
new competencies, ranging from project management skills, through to various acquired 
technological and market capabilities).20 
these three notions of additionality – network, output and behavioural – provide the 
structure for our analysis in this report of the impacts of the Creative Credits experiment 
(Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: additionality and the Creative Credits scheme
Network
BehaviouralOutput
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2.3 Creativity and innovation 
the ‘design intensity’ of an increasingly wide range of products suggests that design plays 
an important role in innovation success.21 designers enhance the functional, emotional and 
symbolic value of products in the eyes of consumers and businesses.22 design–driven, or 
design–led, innovation processes which adopt novel perspectives on particular innovation 
problems may also contribute to the development of more radical innovations with the 
potential to disrupt markets and create large new profit streams.23 there are now a large 
number of studies providing empirical evidence for these claims.24 
a more recent development is evidence that the benefits of a design–oriented approach 
are reflective of the wider business value of engaging with creative services which include, 
but are not restricted to, design.25 
managing creativity and design in the innovation process is not always easy, however. Case 
studies of the involvement of designers in innovation highlight issues relating to: cultural 
barriers associated with language and designers’ self–image; and work process barriers 
related to the different working practices of designers and others involved in innovation. 
so, for example, “the goal of good industrial design [is] perceived by designers to be the 
creation of an ‘iconic’ product – one that [will] become famous and instantly recognizable. 
By contrast, managers [perceive] design as a means to build brand and achieve the right 
price.”26 
similar tensions have also been observed between designers and marketing staff involved 
in innovation: “This frequently [leads] to design–marketing conflict. Designers [are] 
compelled to express performance parameters in marketing terms, of which they [have] 
no experience and [are] unable to understand”.27 Goal incongruity between marketing 
staff and others involved in innovation is, in turn, held by some to lead to conflicts in firms 
attempting to integrate design into their innovation activities.28 
the evidence on creativity, design and innovation has at least two implications for the 
Creative Credits experiment. First, the Creative Credits, insofar as they help smes access 
creative services, should have additional output effects on innovation. second, we might 
expect that issues around communications between design and creative staff and others 
involved in the innovation process will give rise to potential conflicts between firms, raising 
potentially important barriers to the positive effects on innovation. 
2.4 Creativity and open innovation in SmEs
recent evidence suggests that smes are no different from the general population of firms 
in innovation being a driver of business performance.29 there are, however, good reasons 
for thinking that smes differ from larger firms in terms of the ability to realise the benefits 
of open innovation and creative partnerships. open innovation poses particular challenges 
for resource–constrained smes, associated with the need to: (i) develop mechanisms 
for identifying useful external knowledge; (ii) build organizational structures to support 
collaborations, and (iii) absorb externally developed ideas and technologies and make 
them fit for the purpose of their own businesses. these same challenges can make smes 
less attractive as potential collaborators, presenting further barriers to establishing 
partnerships.30 partly as a consequence, it is not surprising that smaller firms are generally 
found to be less ‘open’ – that is, they have fewer external innovation partnerships on 
average – than larger firms.31 
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this does not mean, however, that the benefits of openness for smes are necessarily 
smaller than for large firms. indeed, smes’ more limited internal resources may mean it is 
actually more worthwhile for smes to engage in open innovation strategies than larger 
firms. one recent study finds that small firms benefit greatly at the margin from external 
linkages, but that they reach their cognitive limit to benefitting from openness earlier than 
larger firms, at around 3–4 different external linkages.32 
arguably, these cognitive limits are perpetuated by behavioural failures on the part of 
managers running smes – such as inertia (the tendency to accept the status quo, no matter 
how strong the case for change might be), excessive risk aversion (cognitive biases push 
owners of smes to make choices that anticipate more certain outcomes, particularly at the 
boundaries of their knowledge or experience), and myopia (the tendency to opt for short–
term gain at the expense of longer term, strategic decisions).33
these behavioural failures likely contribute to a reluctance on the part of smes to 
undertake open innovation, which requires novelty, risk tolerance and a willingness to make 
strategic investments. policymakers have responded with instruments such as innovation 
vouchers to overcome some of these behavioural failures and encourage smes to engage 
in open innovation with universities.34 innovation brokers have also been used in some 
situations to help smes identify firms with complementary capabilities and develop new 
innovation partnerships. measures to support collaborative innovation have also been a 
consistent feature of innovation policy in some eu countries leading to the development of 
strong traditions of open innovation. this type of measure has been less common in the uK 
and Germany than in some other eu countries, however, most notably Finland.35 
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Section 3: 
CREATIvE CREdITS:  
AN RCT+ ExPERImENT
Key points:
in the scheme’s pilot in the manchester City region between october 2009 and 
november 2010, 150 Creative Credits – vouchers with a face value of £4,000 – were 
awarded to eligible smes to develop collaborative innovation projects with a creative 
business. the smes were required to contribute a further £1,000 of their own towards 
their project. 
We profile the anticipated impact of the Creative Credits scheme in a ‘logic model’. 
this hypothesises that in smes, behavioural failures linked to inertia, excessive risk 
aversion and myopia lead to lower levels of collaboration than is socially desirable. 
Creative Credits may help firms to overcome these behavioural failures and lead to 
increased levels of connectivity between firms and therefore innovation. in the longer 
term, the Creative Credits logic model suggests that this should lead to behavioural 
changes and stronger business performance. 
We tested the Creative Credits scheme’s logic model with a controlled experiment, 
using what we call an ‘rCt+’ evaluation methodology. this has three key features:  
(i) a randomized allocation of Creative Credits to firms (the ‘treatment’ group), 
enabling the scheme’s additional impacts to be rigorously evaluated by comparing 
innovation and business performance in the ‘treatment’ group with a ‘control’ group 
of firms made up of non–recipients; (ii) a longitudinal data strategy, allowing the 
longer term as well as short–term impacts to be assessed, and (iii) a mixed–methods 
empirical approach, combining qualitative interviews with quantitative survey 
techniques. 
We note the rarity of randomized controlled trials in industrial policymaking. We 
argue, however, that their use is important in situations where selection biases are 
severe – that is, when the businesses that self–select to, or that are selected to, 
participate in support programmes are already more innovative than the ‘average’ 
business the policymaker is targeting. a recent evaluation of sme innovation support 
schemes in the manufacturing sector, funded by the european Commission, suggests 
that this is not the exception, but the rule.
there are arguments for randomization that are related to cost effectiveness too: it 
is a cheaper, simpler and, arguably, fairer method of allocating constrained business 
support resources amongst firms than alternative methods based on subjective 
assessments of worthiness by programme managers.
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3.1 Introduction 
the empirical evidence reviewed in section 2 provides the broad context for exploring 
interventions to encourage smes to work with creative partners as part of their innovation 
activity. in this section, we focus on the different elements of the Creative Credits 
experiment: its underlying logic model; the justification for the use of formal experimental 
methods; the implementation of the Creative Credits pilot in the manchester City region; 
and, the deployment of our evaluation methodology. 
section 3.2 focuses on the logic model for Creative Credits. this sets out the rationale for 
intervention, suggests how Creative Credits should work, and forms hypotheses about its 
short–term outputs and longer term outcomes. testing the causal process envisaged in 
the logic model is the main focus of the evaluation. the traditional approach to evaluating 
business support programmes is to conduct an ex post evaluation, asking participating 
businesses to reflect on their experience of the scheme. We adopt an alternative 
experimental approach which combines three main elements: randomized allocation of 
Creative Credits, longitudinal data collection, and the use of mixed methods. 
section 3.3 outlines the background to the Creative Credits experiment, discussing both 
the methodological and economic arguments for taking the rCt+ approach. sections 
3.4 and 3.5 briefly describe the implementation of the Creative Credits scheme and its 
evaluation. 
3.2 Creative Credits, how it works and its logic model
Whether or not they recognise it in these terms, all firms have innovation processes, some 
well developed, others not. the quality and the extent to which a firm’s innovation process 
is embedded in its business practices determine its long–term competitive position. 
there is a great deal of evidence for market (or system) failures in smes’ innovation 
processes. most obviously, smes face difficulties in accessing external funding sources, 
owing to information asymmetries between lenders and smes about their commercial 
prospects.36 
such failures may be compounded by behavioural failures on the part of the managers of 
smes: inertia, excessive risk aversion and myopia may form significant barriers to changing 
attitudes and routines which, it is argued, leads firms to make insufficient investments 
in innovation.37 together, these market, system and behavioural failures can act as 
overwhelming constraints for smes when it comes to introducing novelty.
interventions such as Creative Credits aim to overcome these failures, by encouraging 
collaboration with businesses in the creative industries. the aim is to test whether a one–
off injection of creativity can ‘nudge’ smes into being more innovative. the idea of nudging 
innovation this way is prompted by theoretical arguments that creative businesses are less 
prone to the behavioural failures discussed earlier, and empirical research which suggests 
that firms which make greater use of services from the creative industries have superior 
innovation performance.38 
the ‘logic model’ for the Creative Credits scheme is shown in Figure 3.1. this links 
the justification for public intervention in the relationship between smes and creative 
businesses, the scheme’s objectives, the process by which the scheme operates, its 
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immediate outputs and intended longer term outcomes.39 it also points to the Key 
performance indicators which provide an indication of the effectiveness of the Creative 
Credits scheme. 
Figure 3.1: logic model for Creative Credits
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the logic model describes how the award of a Creative Credit should help smes overcome 
the barriers to innovation associated with financial barriers and behavioural failures: smes 
develop new collaborations with a business partner in the creative industries, which lead to 
innovations and improvements in firms’ longer term competitive positions. For the creative 
partner, the Creative Credit represents a potentially valuable new business opportunity (the 
scheme requires that creative businesses and smes have not previously worked with each 
other) certainly in the short– and potentially the longer term too. 
the final elements of the logic model relate to the specification of the scheme’s outputs 
and their relationship to longer term outcomes, identifying possible contingent factors. 
in the short term, the outputs from Creative Credits are measured primarily in terms of 
increased levels of interactions between smes and creative businesses relative to what 
would have prevailed absent the intervention – or in other words, network additionality. 
in the longer term, we anticipate that this might generate three types of outcome: output 
additionality, as innovations result from the Creative Credits projects which impact on sales 
and growth; behavioural additionality, as organizational learning takes place and smes 
learn to work with, and value more highly, creative inputs to innovation; and, perhaps, 
further network additionality, as smes absorb the value of partnering for innovation. the 
logic model highlights that such outcomes are contingent on other factors influencing 
firms’ innovation processes, however, and that these need to be controlled for, along with 
market and other contextual factors, if the scheme is to be convincingly evaluated.
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3.3 The Creative Credits experiment – rationale
as the evidence reviewed in section 2 suggests, there are arguments for public 
intervention to promote connectivity between smes and creative service providers to 
stimulate innovation. public intervention in this arena is a recent development, however, 
and goes beyond current experience with innovation vouchers which have largely focussed 
on linking firms to technical knowledge providers such as universities.40 this raises the 
question of how the effectiveness of the Creative Credits scheme should be assessed. 
a standard approach might be to commission a small–scale pilot exercise and undertake 
monitoring and an ex post evaluation. this would typically involve the allocation of support 
using some type of peer review or assessment mechanism to explore the appetite for any 
larger scheme which might follow. evaluation would then seek to assess the impact of the 
scheme, potentially allowing for any selection bias, using econometric methods, which 
might have occurred in the allocation of the business support. this type of evaluation 
– allowing for potential selection biases – has been emphasised by the oeCd as best 
practice in ex post evaluation and has been widely applied in recent years.41
the ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’ is that the treated outcomes and non–
treated outcomes for any single firm are never jointly observed.42 the analytical problem 
this raises is how to estimate the difference between the actual realised outcomes and the 
potential outcomes if no treatment had been administered. ideally, the substitute for the 
unobserved (un–treated) outcome needs to meet two criteria: (i) it should be observable to 
the researcher and (ii) it should be an internally ‘valid’ substitute for the set of un–treated 
outcomes.43 validity in this sense requires that “the only difference between the member 
of the control group and the member of the treated group corresponds to the fact that the 
latter is treated and the first one is not” (reiner, 2011, p. 18). 
the standard approach to piloting business support schemes breaches this requirement. 
the pilot might, for example, be targeted on firms which are ‘better’ than others in some 
sense, suggesting that the difference between the treated and control group would reflect 
both the effects of this selection and the treatment itself. one recent study, for example, 
illustrates how funding allocations in the norwegian research Council are based on ex ante 
project rankings generating a potential selection bias when evaluating the research 
Council’s funding decisions.44 related biases may also arise in cases where firms self–
select to apply for a scheme. in the case of an innovation support measure, for example, 
only firms which are at the point of application interested in innovating in the current 
period are likely to apply. in its assessment of innovation support schemes for smes in 
the manufacturing sector in seven european regions, the european Commission’s Gprix 
project finds that businesses that are selected to participate in standard programmes do 
not actually benefit from them, whereas support allocated to firms on a random basis has 
positive impacts.45 
the prevalence of these selection issues in policy evaluation has led to the development 
and widespread application of econometric approaches which can ‘control’ for potential 
selection biases. typically, such approaches involve a two–step process, modelling first the 
probability that a firm will be in the treatment rather than the control group, and second 
the impact of the treatment ‘controlling’ for any selection biases. implementing this type of 
approach, however, involves making restrictive structural assumptions about the underlying 
causal processes and often poses significant statistical issues in terms of identification, 
requiring for example the use of a variable or group of variables which influence the 
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probability of being in the treatment group but which have no influence on subsequent 
outcomes. these procedures – called instrumental variables techniques – are difficult to 
validate as tests which attempt to do so have notoriously low statistical power; that is, they 
have a high tendency to conclude that the identification schemes are valid when in fact 
they are not. 
the very great difficulties in controlling for selection bias point to the alternative 
experimental approach with random allocation of firms into the treatment and control 
groups. “Random assignment [also] removes any systematic correlation between treatment 
status and both observed and unobserved participant characteristics. Estimated treatment 
effects are therefore free from the selection bias that potentially taints all estimates based 
on non–experimental sources of information.”46 in other words, with random allocation of 
firms between the treatment and control groups, it is possible to directly infer the impact 
of the scheme as the difference between outcomes for the two groups. 
a number of potential issues arise, however, even with this type of rCt approach:47 
•	it is not clear if the results of any single experiment can be generalised to the target 
population and to what extent they can be generalised to other populations – that is, 
whether the results are ‘externally’ valid. 
•	it is possible that substitution biases occur if a firm in the control group, through either 
applying to Creative Credits or participating in the scheme’s evaluation, accesses other 
types of public support for their proposed project, leading to an under–estimation of 
the additional impact of the scheme. 
•	adverse selection biases may occur if firms that are not representative of the wider 
business population apply to Creative Credits e.g. firms that apply may have more 
of a history of applying to public support schemes or perhaps be more ‘innovation–
engaged’ (and annex 2 of this paper confirms this is indeed what we found in the pilot). 
•	a further source of possible bias is if there are patterns in the types of business that 
drop out from the scheme after the random assignment. depending on the scale of 
any drop–out, additionality estimates compiled on the basis of the original randomized 
treatment group may not reflect those of the group actually treated. in the manchester 
pilot, we attempted to minimise the possibility of such a bias by randomly selecting 
eligible firms to be on a reserve list to take the place of any businesses that did not take 
up their Creative Credits after they had been assigned. 
While these issues are potentially important and have implications for the statistical 
robustness of what we can infer from an rCt, we concur with the european Commission’s 
Gprix project48 in believing that the statistical case for using an rCt methodology to 
evaluate a scheme like Creative Credits, where selection biases would otherwise potentially 
be severe, is overwhelming. our case is compounded by economic arguments for random 
assignment: unlike alternative approaches based on expert opinion on which firms are 
worthier of support than others, the selection process is cheap to administer, a not 
insignificant consideration when policymakers are facing a tight financial environment. 
We characterise the evaluation approach we developed in the Creative Credits experiment 
as ‘rCt+’, in that it combines an rCt–based quantitative assessment with longitudinal 
data collection and qualitative follow–up to help test the logic model in Figure 3.1. the 
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evaluation focuses on the ‘causative’ elements of the programme theory underlying the 
scheme. in other words, the evaluation objective is not just to assess the additionality of 
programme outcomes but also to consider whether these outcomes are being achieved 
through the mechanisms envisaged in the underlying programme theory.49 this requires a 
theoretically grounded analysis of process and causal mechanisms alongside the evaluation 
of outcomes.50 in empirical terms, this underlines the value of our methodological 
approach: that of a mixed–methods evaluation combining a qualitatively structured 
examination of underlying processes and decisions with a more quantitative assessment of 
causal process and outcomes.51 
3.4 The Creative Credits experiment – implementation52 
Creative Credits was piloted in the manchester City region in the north–West of england 
between september 2009 and october 2010.53 150 Creative Credits were distributed in 
two waves roughly six months apart. each Creative Credit had a face value of £4,000 
with recipient firms also required to contribute a minimum of £1,000 towards the cost of 
the project with their creative partner. in fact, the average budget for the Creative Credits 
projects across the two waves was £5,400, with smes contributing in practice an average 
of £1,400 over and above the value of the Creative Credit. 
the first wave of Creative Credits opened for applications in september 2009 and the 
second in February 2010. applications from smes were received and each of these were 
checked by nesta staff for eligibility. the Creative Credits scheme was open to smes 
(excluding sole traders) in almost any sector of the economy with the exceptions of 
primary industries and the creative industries. Creative Credits was marketed through 
various channels in the manchester City region. the regional partners played a crucial role 
in promoting the opportunity to relevant smes and creative businesses through Business 
link advisors, north West development agency networks, manchester City Council 
networks, and other business and financial advisors to smes. promotional efforts also 
included a regional media campaign, a launch event, email and telemarketing, as well as an 
online presence developed through Facebook and linkedin. more than 2,000 firms made 
an enquiry about the scheme through its two waves of operation. in the event, a total of 
672 smes made eligible applications for the Creative Credits scheme: 312 in the first wave 
and 501 in the second, 141 applying in both waves.
amongst applicants, the sector with greatest representation was services, and in particular: 
Consultancy, professional services, General Business services and retail. no applications 
were received from the aerospace or medical sectors. applications were received from all 
boroughs included in the pilot. Figure 3.2 illustrates the geographical breakdown of the 
group of smes which received a Creative Credit compared with that for all applicants. the 
turnover of the group of firms applying for the scheme also varied relatively widely (Figure 
3.3), although over one–half of all applicants had an annual turnover of less than £500,000. 
and within this group, a fifth of all applicants reported that their turnover was less than 
£100,000 per year.
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Figure 3.2: percentages of applicants and recipients by borough
Figure 3.2: percentages of applicants and recipients by business size (turnover)
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Comparing the group of Creative Credits applicants to the eligible population of companies 
in the mCr provides an indication of the penetration of the scheme. data from Companies 
House suggests that there were perhaps around 4,200 eligible firms in the mCr of which 
672, or around 1:6, applied for the Creative Credits scheme. 
applications were not, however, evenly spread across the size distribution of firms, with 
micro businesses (those with less than ten employees) and firms with more than fifty 
employees under–represented in the group of Creative Credits applicants, and firms with 
between ten and fifty employees significantly over–represented. Compared with the overall 
application proportion of 1:6, this meant that for the individual size bands the scheme 
penetration was: 1:8 for micro firms with less than 10 employees; 1:2 for firms with 10–50 
employees and 1:16 for smes with more than 50 employees. 
once applications had been received, a lottery of the eligible applications was held in each 
of the two waves to allocate Creative Credits, with 75 firms in each group being notified 
that they had been ‘awarded’ a Creative Credit. in addition, a small number of ‘reserve’ 
firms were also selected by lottery to replace those where the awarded Creative Credit 
was declined by the sme.54 in total, 22 per cent of the eligible businesses that applied were 
awarded a Creative Credit. For firms in the first wave these awards were made in october 
2009, and in the second wave in march 2010. 
subsequent to the award of their Creative Credits, smes were encouraged to identify a 
creative partner and develop a collaborative project proposal. to help with this process, 
a web–based marketplace – a ‘Creatives Gallery’ – of creative firms55 was designed and 
made available by nesta to all eligible smes in both the treatment and control groups. the 
majority of creative businesses on the Gallery classified themselves as offering ‘design 
or Web design’ (79 per cent), with 63 per cent of businesses listing this as their primary 
offering. over 50 per cent of businesses offered ‘advertising or pr’ as a service (20 per 
cent of businesses listed this as their primary service). twenty–four per cent of businesses 
offered ‘Film and video’ services; 9 per cent listed this as their primary service. very few 
businesses listed any other service as their primary offering. ‘software’ was not listed by 
any businesses as their primary service but it was offered as a secondary service by 13 per 
cent of creative businesses. ‘publishing’ and ‘tv and radio’ were also significant secondary 
services offered.
the aim of creating the online Gallery was to explore the potential for a minimal brokerage 
model and reduce the burden of administrative costs of the pilot – for the programme 
managers and the smes alike. smes awarded a Creative Credit were encouraged to 
navigate the Gallery on their own to select their preferred provider, and creative firms on 
the Creatives Gallery were also able to contact prospective sme partners, as per normal 
business practice. 
in the event, the 150 Creative Credits were ‘spent’ with 79 creative service providers, with 
one service provider working with 13 Creative Credit recipients. once a partnership was 
formed, all Creative Credits projects were required to be completed within five months, i.e. 
by end–march 2010 for those in the first wave and mid–september 2010 for those in the 
second wave. 
as discussed earlier, random allocation was used to avoid any systematic bias in the 
characteristics of treated firms and to help provide a more robust indication of the extent 
of additionality of Creative Credits.56 Care was taken wherever possible to minimise 
selection biases in the experiment: so, for example, in the promotion of the scheme, 
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randomized business lists were used in the marketing calls and care was taken to minimise 
locational or sectoral biases. details of the implementation of the randomization, and the 
rCt+ methodology within which it was embedded, are provided in annex 1. 
the evaluation of the Creative Credits experiment began in september 2009 and aimed 
to consider both the scheme’s short–term additionality and its potential longer term 
outcomes. Qualitative and quantitative data collection comprised of two quantitative 
surveys at the start and finish of the Creative Credits project and two further surveys 
conducted six months and twelve months after its completion. Qualitative data collection 
was similarly conducted in four stages, in each case after the quantitative survey to avoid 
influencing the survey responses.
the initial quantitative baseline survey (survey 1) was conducted immediately after the 
lottery to award the Creative Credits. 451 responses were received – 150 from the treatment 
group (those awarded a Creative Credit), 301 from the control group (those who applied 
and were unsuccessful). over the next three surveys attrition was, as expected, evident 
in each survey (table a1.1 and Figure a1.1), and cash incentives were used to maximise 
response rates (though, as we discuss later, this does not appear to have induced any 
biases in our results57). By survey 4, a year after the Creative Credits projects finished, 
respondent numbers had fallen to 157 among the control group (52.2 per cent of those 
firms initially responding to survey 1) and 117 among the treatment group (78.0 per cent 
of survey 1 respondents). Comparison between the characteristics of respondents to all of 
the four surveys – the longitudinal sample – and those firms which dropped out confirm, 
however, that there are no systematic differences between firms who responded to all four 
surveys and those who dropped out during the study (table a1.2). 
stages 1, 2 and 4 of the qualitative data collection consisted of semi–structured interviews 
(106 in total), while stage 3 comprised two workshops using the Journey making58 
technique from operational research. smes in the treatment group and creative businesses 
working with them were both included in the process. as with the quantitative surveys, 
attrition was evident, especially amongst the creative businesses: the stage 1 interviews 
covered 24 pairings (smes and their creative partners), while by stage 4 this had fallen to 11 
pairings, plus the ‘surviving’ partner of 9 further pairings in cases where the other business 
had closed or had withdrawn from the interview process. Further details of the samples 
and the qualitative research methodology are given in annex 1.
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Section 4: 
ThE CREATIvE CREdITS  
ExPERImENT: RESulTS 
Key points:
Creative Credits generated significant short–term network additionality, with the 
award of a Creative Credit increasing the likelihood that firms would undertake their 
innovation project (with a creative business they had not previously worked with) by 
at least 84 per cent. 
the evidence also suggests there was statistically significant output additionality in 
the form of product and process innovations: in the six months immediately following 
the Creative Credits projects, firms were significantly more likely to have introduced 
product and process innovations than those that were not assigned Creative Credits. 
Creative Credits also had a (weakly) significantly positive effect on the sales growth 
of the treatment group after 6 months. 
twelve months after the completion of the Creative Credits projects, however, 
there was no longer a statistically significant difference between the treatment and 
control groups in the proportion of smes innovating, nor in their sales growth, in the 
previous six months. though we note that only a minority of firms in the treatment 
group at the twelve–month stage reported having received the whole benefit from 
their Creative Credits projects. We go some way to validate the robustness of this 
particular finding by establishing a significant positive correlation between firms who 
said shortly after completing their projects (in survey 2) that they were expecting 
peak benefits in a year’s time and those who said that they had in fact done so after 
twelve months (in survey 4). 
there was no evidence of network additionality after twelve months, or of 
behavioural additionality: smes receiving Creative Credits were no more likely to have 
worked with creative service providers or other innovation partners than other firms. 
the qualitative research suggests two main reasons for this. First, in some cases 
smes felt that their Creative Credits project had been ‘transactional’ in nature – self–
contained projects which could in principle have been undertaken with any number 
of innovation partners, and, second, in other cases there were clear incompatibilities 
between the smes and their creative partners, something which – according to some 
smes – nesta might have addressed if it had offered opportunities for brokerage in 
the scheme.
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4.1 Introduction 
in this section we focus on the results from implementing the rCt+ evaluation of Creative 
Credits. We test the different elements of the logic model outlined in section 3.2 and 
the longer term contribution of Creative Credits to strengthening smes’ open innovation 
partnerships. We begin in section 4.2 by assessing the short–term network additionality 
of the scheme, and in particular whether the award of a Creative Credit actually increased 
the probability that an sme went ahead with its project (with a creative partner with which 
they had not previously done business). 
section 4.3 explores the scheme’s output additionality insofar as it impacted on levels of 
innovation activity and sales growth. data from surveys 3 and 4 provide an indication of 
levels of business innovation and sales growth in the period six months and twelve months 
respectively after the completion of the Creative Credits project. section 4.3 also provides 
an indication of the scheme’s longer term output additionality, as we also have information 
on the longer term (three–year) intentions of Creative Credits recipients. We use the 
information gleaned from the qualitative interviews to highlight some of the mechanisms 
shaping the outcomes and firms’ longer term intentions.
most of the quantitative results presented in this section are based on what we label the 
‘longitudinal sample’, i.e. the group of firms in the treatment and control groups which 
responded to each of the four surveys covering the Creative Credits project period and the 
subsequent 12 months. this longitudinal sample comprises 274 firms (117 in the treatment 
group and 157 in the control group) or 60.8 per cent of all firms which responded to our 
initial baseline survey. attrition during the study period – drop out from the sample – 
occurred for a number of reasons, including firm closure and staff changes within smes; 
in addition, a number of firms were simply unwilling to complete all the surveys. annex 
1 profiles the longitudinal sample in some detail and discusses the problem of attrition 
and how we have managed it. there were few systematic patterns among firms dropping 
out of the sample – in other words, firms completing all four surveys appeared to be 
representative of the wider group of smes participating in the scheme. 
section 4.4 focuses on the behavioural and network additionality of Creative Credits 
relating to innovation cooperation – and particularly the likelihood of partnering with 
creative service providers – in the twelve months following completion of the projects. 
the findings of the qualitative research again provide deeper insights into the causal 
mechanisms shaping behavioural and network additionality.
Where results from the qualitative data are reported in the form of quotations or 
conclusions from interviews, each business has been allocated a letter and number to 
signify smes in the treatment group (s), their creative partners (C) and their participation 
in wave 1 or wave 2 of the experiment. so, for example, W1s1 relates to wave 1, sme 1. 
any unattributed quotes come from the ‘free format comments’ boxes in the quantitative 
surveys and therefore cannot be attributed under the non–disclosure terms of those 
surveys. annex 6 presents one–page case studies of three Creative Credits projects.
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4.2 Network additionality of Creative Credits
in this section we exploit the randomized control trial structure of the Creative Credits 
experiment to consider its network additionality, i.e. by how much did the award of a 
Creative Credit increase the probability that an sme entered into a new relationship with a 
creative business? 
all smes were able to access creative partners from the online Gallery and complete their 
innovation projects, whether or not they had been allocated a Creative Credit. of the 301 
firms in the control group which responded to our baseline survey (survey 1), 36 firms (11.9 
per cent) went ahead anyway with their projects within the scheme’s four to five–month 
project timeline. among the group of 150 firms which were assigned Creative Credits, 
144 (96.0 per cent) actually commissioned projects. this group of 451 firms, of which 150 
were Creative Credit recipients and 301 non–recipients, forms the basis for our estimate of 
network additionality. 
the dependent variable in our analysis then takes a value of 1 if a firm commissioned the 
project within the four– to five–month Creative Credits timescale, and zero otherwise. 
table 4.1 reports the results from estimating this simple model using ordinary least 
squares (ols). the coefficients have the following interpretation: without a Creative Credit 
a firm has a probability of 11.9 per cent of commissioning the innovation project (from 
a creative business with which it has not previously worked). this is (at least)59 84 per 
cent more likely when a firm receives a Creative Credit.60 this suggests strong network 
additionality of the receipt of a Creative Credit, with the 90 per cent confidence interval of 
the additionality lying between 78.2 and 89.8 per cent. this interval includes the estimated 
additionality of 79.0 per cent from the analysis undertaken for the pilot for the dutch 
national innovation vouchers scheme.61 
the short–term network additionality of the Creative Credits scheme was strongly 
supported by the interviews conducted with smes immediately following the four to five 
month window within which the Creative Credits projects were completed, with 15 smes 
reporting that the Creative Credit had brought their innovation forward because of the cost 
saving (W1s3, W1s6, W1s8, W1s10, W1s12, W1s13, W2s1, W2s2, W2s4, W2s6, W2s7, W2s8, 
W2s10, W2s11, W2s12).
“I’d have waited. I’d have waited until we’d accumulated more money. And then 
probably programmed it in for sort of the back end of this year. And then launched in 
probably February next year.” 
(w1S10)
“Maybe it’s allowed us to accelerate things and it’s perhaps made me focus on it rather 
than put things off. So it’s got things moving quicker than if I’d been left to my own 
devices.” 
(w1S8)
“It’s something which I guess if we didn’t have the Credit it wouldn’t be the first thing 
on the top of my head. I wouldn’t say, ‘Oh I’m gonna make a video before doing say 
conferences’, and actually even now I couldn’t honestly say that, because I think in 
terms of importance I think probably getting out to conferences is more important at 
this stage. But, interestingly enough, if we ever get to the point where we were more 
comfortable and we did have a bit of spare cash, then actually I would think about 
another video because I do like the media and I think it’s quite powerful”. 
(w1S3)
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Number of observations 451
Adjusted R–squared 0.653 
variable  Coefficient  Std. Err.  t–statistic  Signif.
Creative 0.840 0.028  29.11*** 0.000 
Credit 
Constant 0.119 0.017  7.18*** 0.000 
term
Table 4.1: simple ols treatment model regression
Notes: analysis is based on respondents to the initial baseline survey undertaken immediately after the allocation 
of Creative Credits. *** denotes significance at the 1 per cent level.
the ols estimates of additionality in table 4.1 implicitly assume that there are no 
systematic differences between Creative Credits recipients and the control group of firms, 
other than in their receipt of a Creative Credit. this would of course follow by design of the 
rCt, but in small samples it is always possible such differences may arise, and there is some 
evidence that this is indeed the case for the pilot (see table a1.3). although the differences 
are very small, they may conceivably have introduced biases in the estimated coefficient on 
the treatment term, and it is important to investigate this. 
to do this, we followed standard econometric procedures in estimating two–stage 
multivariate probit models to test the robustness of the ols results: in stage one, we 
modelled the probability of a firm receiving a Creative Credit as a function of firm 
characteristics (table a4.1); and in stage 2 we estimated the impact of the Creative Credit 
on the probability of a firm undertaking its creative project (table a4.2). this analysis 
suggested that there was no selection bias in the estimates and therefore supports the 
validity of the simple ols results reported in table 4.1.62
4.3 Output additionality of Creative Credits – Innovation and sales impacts 
table 4.2 explores whether firms that received Creative Credits were any more likely to 
have innovated in the period following the end of the Creative Credits projects than those 
firms that had not received Creative Credits. 
in the six months following completion of the Creative Credits projects, we saw a marked 
difference between the treatment and control groups, with firms in the former significantly 
more likely to have introduced new products or services, more likely to have introduced 
new to the market products or services and more likely to have introduced new process 
innovations (table 4.2, part a). 
a further six months on, however, the differences were no longer statistically significant 
(and were slightly negative in the case of process innovations) (table 4.2, part B). 
29   CREaTiVE CREDiTS  a randomized controlled industrial policy experiment
these results suggest that there was significant output additionality from the Creative 
Credits scheme, but that this additionality was short–lived. similar results are found in the 
multivariate analysis (tables a4.4 and a4.5), though there is weak evidence that firms 
receiving Creative Credits were more likely to have introduced new to market innovations 
even twelve months out.
  Control Treatment t–statistic Signif. 
 N % firms % firms
A. After 6 months
Product or service 
innovation 145/105 55.9 72.4 2.740*** 0.007
New to the market  
innovation 126/92 23.0 35.9 2.089** 0.038
Process innovation 142/105 47.2 63.8 2.618*** 0.009
  Control Treatment t–statistic Signif. 
 N % firms % firms
B. After 12 months
Product or service 
innovation 154/113 63.0 70.8 1.345 0.180
New to the market  
innovation 135/97 32.6 40.2 1.192 0.235
Process innovation 153/111 51.0 47.7 –0.517 0.606
Table 4.2: output additionality in terms of the probability of innovation: 6 months  
 and 12 months after the completion of the Creative Credits projects
Notes: table is based on the longitudinal sample. see annex 1 for details, after six months, firms were asked 
whether they had produced more or fewer production innovations in the previous six months. after twelve 
months, firms were again asked about their innovation performance in the previous six months. differences in 
response numbers between questions and between 6 and 12 months reflect those respondents not answering 
particular questions and those selecting the (‘don’t know’) response. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent 
level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
We might have expected this pattern of significant, but not sustained, impacts from 
Creative Credits on innovation to have been echoed in the sales performance of firms, 
and this is indeed what we found. table 4.3 summarizes the distribution of sales growth 
of smes in the longitudinal sample receiving Creative Credits and those not, six and 
twelve months after the completion of the Creative Credits projects. although this period 
coincided with a period of deep economic recession, and therefore challenging times for 
all the smes in our study, the comparison of performance between treatment and control 
group firms is still statistically valid. 
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 Impacts after 6 months* Impacts after 12 months
 Control  Treatment  All Control  Treatment  All 
 N=146 N=107 N=253 N=155 N=114 N=269
Sales have fallen 
20% or more 6.8 5.6 6.3 7.1 7.0 7.1
Sales have fallen  
by 10–19% 6.8 4.7 5.9 9.0 6.1 7.8
Sales have fallen 
by 1–9% 9.6 2.8 6.7 10.3 7.9 9.3
Sales have 
remained similar 28.1 36.4 31.6 29.0 23.7 26.8
Sales have risen 
by 1–9% 13.0 23.4 17.4 13.5 16.7 14.9
Sales have risen 
by 10–19% 17.8 13.1 15.8 11.0 21.9 15.6
Sales have risen 
20% or more 17.8 14.0 16.2 20.0 16.7 18.6
Average growth rates  6.445 7.53 6.9 4.71 7.81 6.02
Table 4.3: output additionality in terms of sales growth: 6 and 12 months after   
 completion of Creative Credits projects
Notes: table is based on the longitudinal sample and responses. see annex 1 for details. after six months, firms 
were asked to select a band within which their sales had grown/fallen in the previous six months. after twelve 
months, firms were again asked to choose a band within which their sales had grown/fallen in the previous six 
months. For impact after six months, difference in distribution of growth rates between control and treatment 
groups χ2(6)=11.464, p=0.075; after 12 months χ2(6)=7.701, p=0.261. average growth rates derived using group 
means. differences in response numbers between different questions and between 6 and 12 months reflect those 
respondents not answering particular questions in the survey and those selecting the (‘don’t know’) response. 
* denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
after six months (survey 3) we see a (weakly) significant difference between the 
distribution of growth rates of the control and treatment groups, with the award of the 
Creative Credit lowering the proportion of firms with declining sales (the p value of 0.075 
means that there is only a 7.5 per cent probability of incorrectly rejecting the hypothesis 
that the growth rates of the two groups of firms were identical). after twelve months, 
although the difference in average growth rates was even bigger – at 3.1 per cent compared 
with 1.1 per cent after six months – it was no longer statistically significant. these results 
are confirmed by the multivariate analysis, where although sales growth of those smes 
receiving Creative Credits was higher on average than those in the control group, the 
differences were not statistically significant (table a4.6).
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these additional sales impacts do, however, need to be treated with some caution, as 
they may under–estimate the longer term sales effects of the Creative Credits projects. 
Consistent with this, table 4.4 summarises the anticipated duration of firms’ sales benefits 
at the time of survey 4, with only 17.6 per cent of firms reporting that they had already by 
this time received all of the benefits of their Creative Credits project (and a further 5.6 per 
cent saying that they had experienced no benefits at all). a further 23.1 per cent of firms 
anticipated obtaining the remaining benefits from their Creative Credits project over the 
next year, and well over 50 per cent of smes said the benefits would fully accrue over the 
next two years and beyond.
Comparing the reported sales growth figures for smes which had either obtained all of the 
benefits of their Creative Credits project, or expected to have done so before survey 4, 
with those anticipating longer term benefits suggests some marked differences. average 
growth during the year after the Creative Credits project for firms anticipating all the 
benefits within one year of completion was 7.7 per cent, compared with only 2.0 per 
cent for firms anticipating longer term benefits from their projects (t=2.141, p=0.035).63 
this difference underlies the great heterogeneity in the time profile of benefits enjoyed 
by different firms, and, in general, the difficulty of making a complete assessment of the 
growth impacts within the timescale of our study. 
to summarise, we find evidence of statistically significant output additionality in the form 
of more product and process innovations within six months of completing their Creative 
Credits projects. However, the differences in innovation were not statistically significant 
twelve months after the projects had been completed. this pattern is broadly mirrored 
in the observed sales impacts too. Considering the evidence that most of the smes still 
expected further benefits to materialise in the future from their projects, however, it is 
perhaps best to think of the estimated additional sales benefits as a lower bound for the 
true figure.
 N % of firms 
No benefits experienced from the Creative Credits project 6 5.6
you have already got all the benefits 19 17.6
you expect to get all the benefits in the next year 25 23.1
In the next two years 46 42.6
In the next 3–5 years 10 9.3
It will take more than 5 years to get all of the benefits 2 1.9
Total  108 100.0
Table 4.4: anticipated duration of sales benefits from Creative Credits:  
 treatment firms 
Notes: table is based on the longitudinal sample. see annex 1 for details.
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4.4 Behavioural additionality 
along with their potential to stimulate specific innovations it was also anticipated that 
Creative Credits might encourage smes to become generally ‘more innovative’ firms.
table 4.5 compares the probability that smes in the control and treatment groups said 
they were likely to engage in innovation in a number of different areas over the next three 
years. there were no significant differences at either six or twelve months following the 
completion of the Creative Credits projects – a finding that was confirmed in multivariate 
analysis (tables a4.7 and a4.8). 
Table 4.5: Future innovation intentions for control and treatment firms: 6 months  
 and 12 months after completion of Creative Credits projects 
  Not Quite very  Not Quite very 
 N likely likely likely likely likely likely χ2(2) Signif. 
 
A. After 6 months
Goods or  
services 248 4.3 35.5 60.3 5.6 27.1 67.3 2.036 0.361
Processes 245 7.9 34.5 57.6 8.5 33.0 58.5 .074 0.964
Strategy  235 15.7 41.8 42.5 12.9 38.6 48.5 .912 0.634
New technologies 204 38.5 36.8 24.8 41.4 42.5 16.1 2.321 0.313
Organization 216 39.5 28.7 31.8 44.8 32.2 23.0 1.984 0.371
marketing  231 10.4 40.7 48.9 11.5 45.8 42.7 .864 0.649
B. After 12 months
Goods or  
services 257 6.7 40.9 52.3 7.4 35.2 57.4 .876 0.645
Processes 260 9.3 42.4 48.3 11.9 36.7 51.4 1.059 0.589
Strategy  249 14.6 45.8 39.6 18.1 38.1 43.8 1.583 0.453
New technologies 206 47.6 29.8 22.6 45.1 32.9 22.0 .224 0.894
Organization 221 49.3 36.6 14.2 47.1 32.2 20.7 1.676 0.433
marketing  235 18.4 38.2 43.4 15.2 48.5 36.4 2.464 0.292
Control Treatment
Notes: table is based on the longitudinal sample. see annex 1 for details. differences in response numbers 
between different questions and between 6 and 12 months reflect those respondents not answering particular 
questions and those selecting the (‘don’t know’) response. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 
per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
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one other anticipated outcome from the Creative Credits scheme was its potential to 
overcome the reticence of smes to partner with other businesses, and creative businesses in 
particular, as part of their innovation strategies. 
table 4.6 compares the percentage of innovating firms in the control and treatment groups 
working with creative service providers and other types of innovation partner six and twelve 
months after the completion of the Creative Credits projects. again, there is no evidence of 
behavioural additionality, as it relates to the collaborative behaviour of innovating firms in the 
treatment group either 6 or 12 months after the completion of the projects.
Table 4.6: additionality in terms of probability of innovation cooperation: 6 months 
 and 12 months after completion of Creative Credits projects
  Control Treatment t–statistic Signif. 
 N % firms % firms
A. After 6 months
Other group  
companies 79/73 27.8 31.5 0.490 0.625
Suppliers 81/74 58.0 52.7 –0.662 0.509
Creative service  
suppliers 80/75 53.8 58.7 0.613 0.540
Customers 81/74 58.0 55.4 –0.327 0.744
Competitors 79/73 24.1 9.6 –2.429 0.016
higher Education  
Institutes 81/75 22.2 20.0 –0.338 0.736
Public laboratories 81/74 12.3 10.8 –0.297 0.767
A. After 12 months
Other group  
companies 93/75 33.3 37.3 0.536 0.593
Suppliers 95/77 52.6 63.6 1.458 0.147
Creative service  
suppliers 95/77 52.6 64.9 1.637 0.104
Customers 95/77 65.3 71.4 0.864 0.389
Competitors 96/77 24.0 32.5 1.228 0.221
higher Education  
Institutes 93/78 29.0 26.9 –0.305 0.761
Public laboratories 94/76 11.7 18.4 1.204 0.231
Notes: table is based on the longitudinal sample. see annex 1 for details. respondents numbers are given as 
‘control group/treatment group’. differences in response numbers between different questions and between 
6 and 12 months reflect those respondents not answering particular questions and those selecting the (‘don’t 
know’) response. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
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one further possibility considered in the evaluation was whether firms in the treatment 
and control groups were intending in the future to partner with external organizations on 
innovation projects. 
specifically, firms were asked whether as part of their innovation activity over the next three 
years they expected to work with creative businesses. the results in table 4.7 echo those 
in table 4.6: there was no evidence that Creative Credits had stimulated sustained new 
innovation partnerships between smes and creative businesses.
in our interviews, we probed smes for the reasons why their Creative Credits projects had 
not had changed their intentions to work with creative service providers. these clearly 
pointed to two considerations. First, for a number of smes there was a sense that their 
Creative Credits project had been based on a ‘transactional’ relationship with their creative 
service providers. indeed, fifteen of the nineteen smes interviewed at the time of survey 4 
referred to having already worked with other creative businesses prior to applying to the 
Creative Credits scheme. For these firms, Creative Credits gave them an opportunity to 
work with a new creative partner, but generated little new organizational learning about 
partnering with creative businesses in general. as a result, most of the smes ended their 
working relationship with their Creative Credits partner when their projects had completed, 
consistent with their previous working relationships with creative businesses (W1s7, W1s9, 
W1s10, W1s12, W2s4, W2s6). 
the second apparent reason for the lack of sustained network additionality suggested by 
some smes in the interviews was a sense of dissatisfaction on their part with their creative 
partners (W1s7, W1s8, W1s9, W1s11, W2s2, W2s4).
For several smes, the dissatisfaction related to the attitude of their creative partner: “I 
can’t say that we learnt much in terms of what they did. It still felt like we were going cap 
in hand for any amends or any corrections or anything like that, it did feel that they were in 
a sense had bigger fish to fry than our project” (W2s4). one sme felt they “were not big 
enough for the website people. They always want to try and push you into something that 
Table 4.7: additionality in terms of intended future cooperation with creative   
 service providers: 6 months and 12 months after completion of Creative  
 Credits projects 
  Not Quite very  Not Quite very 
 N likely likely likely likely likely likely χ2(2) Signif. 
 
A. After 6 months
Creative services  240 10.1 43.9 46.0 4.0 39.6 56.4 4.421 0.110
A. After 12 months
Creative services  253 16.3 44.2 39.5 12.3 45.3 42.5 .847 0.655
Control Treatment
Notes: table is based on the longitudinal sample. see annex 1 for details. differences in response numbers 
between different questions and between 6 and 12 months reflect those respondents not answering particular 
questions and those selecting the (‘don’t know’) response. * denotes significance between the control and 
treatment groups at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level.
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is far bigger than you really are I didn’t actually learn anything from them” (W2s2). another 
spoke of how, “I sort of trusted in them to do it all really... I wish I’d sort of prepared for it 
better, then I probably would have got more out of them...or certainly it would have gone in 
the direction I wanted it to go in” (w1S7).
such comments were validated in the interviews with creative service providers themselves 
which tended also to emphasise communication difficulties, different interpretations 
of what the project objectives were and how great a priority the different partners 
had attached to the projects.64 so, one creative service provider commented of their 
sme partner that “they didn’t seem to want to go in some of the directions we were 
suggesting to them” (w2C12). others felt that the smes had very set ideas about 
what they wanted, seeing the Creative Credits project as a ‘quick fix’ and treating their 
creative services provider as if they were selling a fixed product, rather than developing 
a working relationship in which “there is a trust that can build” (w1C7). in other cases, 
smes seemingly did not provide the information requested by their creative partner, thus 
impeding progress on the commission, “We had to hold their hand all the way through it” 
(w2C12). this may have been due to the sme undervaluing what the creative company 
could offer because it was seen as “a one–off hit where they got something for free…They 
may not need what you’re selling” (w1C7). 
By contrast, successful projects were distinguished by good communication between 
partners leading to a shared understanding of the project objectives. For example, 
“Because my relationship has grown with them on a personal level … they’ll back me up 
or help me out … in what I’m trying to do” (w1S5); and “I feel I can work with them on 
projects and I’ve got a better perception of what they can contribute and I can value that 
contribution” (w1S13). the same sentiments applied even where projects were seen as 
transactional, as mentioned earlier: “rather than just give them a brief, I think we will sit 
down with them and create the brief based on some of their ideas as well” (w2S8). this 
good communication also appeared to be related to the likelihood of sustained benefits 
from the project. of the nine smes interviewed in stage 4 who reported continuing 
benefits, seven specifically made positive comments about communication and shared 
understanding, while only two made negative comments.
a number of smes, (W1s1, W1s4, W1s5, W1s9, W1s10, W1s11, W1s12, W1s13, W2s6, W2s7, 
W2s11) suggested that an element of brokerage in the scheme from nesta would have 
helped to reconcile the tensions with their creative partner. these varied from the passive, 
such as changes in the design of the online Creatives Gallery, to the more active, including 
nesta’s involvement in the matching process and the provision of more networking 
opportunities with other smes participating in the scheme.
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Section 5: 
ImPlICATIONS FOR POlICy  
dESIGN ANd EvAluATION 
Key points:
very little policy supporting business is subjected to rigorous evaluation. as a result 
we have no reliable way of knowing if large sums of public money are being wasted. 
Creative Credits is an important innovation in itself: it helps smes more competitive 
by connecting them with creative businesses. 
But the research method used may be even more important, since it not only uses 
randomization to establish the scheme’s additional impact, but also links that 
to longitudinal data collection which is vital in helping to assess the longer term 
effectiveness of different policy tools. this is an approach that should be applied 
much more widely. at a time when public resources are scarce it’s more important 
than ever that we find out what works and what doesn’t – and that principle should 
apply as much to business support as it does to programmes in healthcare or schools.
this research has demonstrated that Creative Credits significantly boosted innovation 
and sales growth in smes in the six months following completion of their Creative 
Credits projects, but that these impacts were no longer statistically significant by the 
time a further six months had passed.
the rCt+ evaluation approach that we adopted combining three elements – 
randomized allocation of Creative Credits, longitudinal data collection and use of 
mixed methods – has proven to be a powerful methodology that we recommend is 
used more widely in developing innovation support schemes. We note that a number 
of cities across europe are now adopting their own Creative Credits–style schemes, 
inspired by the successes of the manchester pilot. in the uK, the Government has 
shown interest in innovation voucher schemes more generally, including a new 
Growth vouchers scheme announced in the 2013 Budget. We advise strongly that 
these schemes should adhere, wherever possible, to a randomized allocation as they 
are rolled out, in order to establish a cumulative evidence base for the effectiveness 
of their progamme design features. 
examination of the rCt dimension of the Creative Credits pilot confirms its high 
degree of internal validity, with strong evidence of both network and output 
additionality. But, arguably, it also demonstrates its limited external validity, with 
significant differences, for example, in the characteristics of smes applying to 
Creative Credits and the general population of smes in the manchester City region 
(this is only arguably, because the target for such schemes may not in fact be the 
wider population of smes in manchester). as with all pilots – controlled experiments 
or otherwise – this suggests that drawing precise inferences from the Creative Credits 
experiment for other firms and regions should always be done with care.
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5.1 Introduction 
in this section, we consider the implications of the findings of the Creative Credits 
experiment for the design and evaluation of sme support initiatives. section 5.2 focuses on 
the key issues arising when implementing the three planks of the rCt+ approach – random 
assignment, longitudinal data and the use of mixed methods. section 5.3 considers the 
implications for future business–to–business voucher schemes inspired by Creative Credits, 
such as those currently being piloted across europe. our emphasis here is on the positive 
impacts of Creative Credits on innovation and the approaches which might be explored to 
strengthen the longer term benefits of the partnerships enabled by Creative Credits. 
5.2 Implementing the RCT+ evaluation approach 
as outlined in section 3, the rCt+ approach we have used to evaluate Creative Credits 
combines three elements: randomized assignment of firms to the treatment and control 
groups, longitudinal data collection, and the use of mixed methods. in this section we 
discuss each of these elements, and comment on their contribution to the evaluation. 
Randomization
the advantages of randomization are self–evident. it has enabled us to evaluate the 
additional impacts of the scheme with a much greater degree of statistical confidence than 
is typically the case with sme support measures. this no doubt helps explain the renewed 
interest that governments in countries like the uK and us have shown in rCts. https://
www.gov.uk/government/publications/what-works-evidence-centres-for-social-policy
in particular, random allocation of the Creative Credits has given the results of the 
experiment a high degree of internal validity: the smes awarded Creative Credits were 
broadly representative of the group that had applied, meaning that there were few if any 
systematic differences between the treatment and control groups, other than in their award 
of a Creative Credit (table a1.2). 
this was actually far from guaranteed. there were three particular challenges. First, 
respondents in both groups were contacted regularly by telephone and email by members 
of the research team to encourage participation in the various surveys, which may 
conceivably have induced self–selection biases if there were differences between those 
firms that responded and those that did not. second, respondents in the control group, 
who were inevitably less motivated to participate in the evaluation of Creative Credits, were 
provided with small cash incentives of £30 to encourage their participation, which again 
may have induced self–selection biases.65 third, the more personal relationships established 
with smes that had participated in the qualitative interviews may arguably have distorted 
their responses to the surveys. yet, despite all these challenges, the similarity of the initial 
characteristics of the treatment and control groups achieved through randomization (table 
a1.2), and also the sustained representativeness of the longitudinal sample of respondents 
for all four surveys (table a1.3) both support the internal validity of the experiment. 
the external validity of an experiment relates to the generalizability of its results to the 
wider population of firms. the first question therefore is whether the group of Creative 
Credits applicants were typical of the wider population of smes in the manchester City 
region (mCr) and therefore whether the results of the experiment were generalizable at 
this level.
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in fact, comparing the characteristics of those smes applying to Creative Credits with 
those that did not suggests that the former differed from the general mCr population 
of smes in several different ways:66 they were more focused on innovation than non–
applicants, at least as indicated by our surveys, more likely to have previously worked with 
external partners, and to have higher internal skill levels than non–applicants (annex 2). 
this suggests that, as with experiments more generally, inferences about the likely impact 
of the scheme on the wider population (including smes in the manchester City region), 
should always be drawn with caution.67
one other element of validity relates to the particular economic conditions which provided 
the backdrop to the Creative Credits experiment. that is, the treatments took place while 
the uK economy, including the manchester City region, was in deep recession.
one sme said of their Creative Credits project that “it was useful at the time, but because 
of the recession and all the rest of it, I don’t believe we’ve really seen the benefit yet, but I 
suspect we will do” (w1S7). another sme could not fully implement the outcome of their 
project because it had not been able to secure bank funding, saying that “We are working 
our guts out, I have to try and raise finance” (w1S3). other smes highlighted issues with 
public procurement with one sme selling into the health service saying that “there are not 
many big jobs around” and “one of my competitors has just made 50 per cent of people 
redundant” (w1S4). 
even where market conditions were perceived as difficult, however, some smes did 
highlight their gains from the Creative Credits projects: “… commerce in the last months 
has been affected by the recession so it’s difficult to know whether the Creative Credit has 
helped deflect further shrinkage in trade than would have been suffered and what impact it 
would have had in normal circumstances. All in all though, a fabulous opportunity for small 
business that had a big impact and was delivered in a smooth and helpful manner”. 
(Survey 4 SmE, comments box).
although the findings’ internal validity were arguably robust to the impact of recession – 
the treatment and control group of smes had been exposed to the same macroeconomic 
conditions – it is nonetheless possible that the severity of the recession may have acted to 
‘swamp’ any differences between the smes receiving Creative Credits and those that did 
not. reflecting on the impact of their Creative Credit, a number of firms in the treatment 
group clearly felt that the recession had impacted on their ability to benefit fully from the 
scheme. one sme commented: 
“We are still experiencing a depressed market due to the recession, but our short term 
future looks better and I expect to see significant up–turn in 2012. As such, our new 
products have not had an easy start in life, but we are happy with their development 
and remain optimistic for their future”  
(Survey 4 SmE, comments box).
still another consideration which may raise questions about the experiment’s validity is if 
the innovation activities of smes in the control group were positively impacted simply by 
applying to Creative Credits and/or being asked to participate in the research68 (these are 
called ‘Hawthorne’ effects in the literature69). such effects might have biased upwards the 
performance of smes in the control group leading to an under–estimate of the impacts of 
Creative Credits. 
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to shed at least some suggestive light on this possibility, we tested if there were any 
differences in the use of other external sources of support for innovation between the 
control and treatment group of firms following the completion of the Creative Credits 
projects; no such differences were identified.70 
longitudinal data collection
one of the key benefits of the longitudinal data collection is that we have been able to 
examine the evolution of the scheme’s impacts over time. this has revealed one of the 
most important findings of the experiment, namely that there were significant impacts on 
innovation and sales growth six months after the end of the Creative Credits projects, but 
that the impacts were not significant after a further six months (tables 4.2 and 4.3). 
these results highlight the limitations of traditional one–off policy evaluations: if we had 
only measured the scheme’s impacts after six months we would have had a skewed view of 
the scheme’s longer term impacts. We have shown that adopting a longitudinal approach 
to evaluating business support schemes insures against potentially misleading inference 
and captures the sustainability of outcomes.71 
this argument also highlights a significant limitation of our own analysis, however. in 
particular, twelve months after the end of the treatment, when asked about whether they 
had derived all of the anticipated sales benefits from the Creative Credit, only 23.2 per cent 
of firms responding said that they had, including the 5.6 per cent who replied they had 
achieved no benefits. the remaining 76.8 per cent suggested that additional benefits would 
accrue over subsequent years (table 4.4). 
the anticipated duration of these potential benefits, and the uncertainty which inevitably 
attaches to firms’ responses, suggests the potential value of extending our analysis 
beyond a 12–month impact period to obtain more accurate outcome data. the trade–off 
here is clear, however: in the obvious delays in obtaining additional research results, and 
the challenges of collecting survey data from smes relating to a support measure which 
fades further away in their memories over time. more broadly, and particularly where 
interventions are more significant in scale than those considered here, this suggests the 
potential value of a longitudinal approach covering relatively long impact periods, of 
perhaps 2–3 years, or even longer in some cases. 
Combining the findings at 6 months and 12 months after project completion, with the fact 
that the great majority of smes were still expecting to see benefits from their Creative 
Credits projects is nonetheless important, as it suggests that the estimated commercial 
benefits are likely to be highly sensitive to when they are measured.
mixed methods 
the quantitative survey findings that Creative Credits had strong network and output 
additionality, at least out to six months, was strongly supported by the qualitative evidence 
gathered through our interviews and the Journey making workshop.
reassuringly, triangulation of qualitative and quantitative findings showed a large measure 
of agreement. For example, 19 smes were interviewed in stage 4. if we compare their 
qualitative reports of sales benefits with their quantitative survey responses in survey 4, we 
find agreement in 17 out of 18 cases. one sme had not completed the quantitative survey: 
in the interview, it revealed that it had experienced sustained sales growth, but it did not 
attribute this to the Creative Credits project. interestingly, this sme’s creative partner 
pointed out in its stage 4 interview that the Creative Credits project had first introduced 
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this sme to the use of social media, and the sme had cited use of social media as the 
reason for its growth in sales. it had attributed this success to the skills of one of its own 
staff members, subsequent to the Creative Credits project. this case is an example of the 
additional detail that the mixed methods approach makes available.
in a good many cases – unsurprisingly, given the web–based nature of the majority of the 
projects – smes felt that their creative partners had portrayed them in a more positive and 
engaging way online to their customers. one firm commented: “certainly it has improved 
the image and it’s improved the response we’re getting, people are getting in touch with us 
which they weren’t before” (w1S13). another sme commented: 
“it’s changed the way that people perceive [us] because instead of looking like a clacky 
old website that I was slightly embarrassed by, it looked like I wanted it to look, because 
the person that designed it originally, the two guys that were involved from the very 
start five years ago, and did the update two and a half years ago, were not the ones I 
should have used. I should have been using a professional organization” 
(w1S10)
For other smes, the Creative Credits projects had resulted in a more unified marketing 
message: “The main impact we’ve had is the little mascot man, the little robot, because he 
also appears on the hard copy material that we produce as well” (w2S8).
Where the qualitative work really came into its own was in helping to provide a deeper 
understanding of the quantitative results. 
First, the qualitative analysis uncovered some of the communication and co–ordination 
issues which had arisen between the smes and their creative partners, and which helped 
to explain the dissipation of the network and behavioural impacts of the creative projects 
twelve months out. 
one consequence of these communication and coordination difficulties – and the tensions 
they created in some of the sme–creative relationships – was a lack of organizational 
learning on the part of some smes, which was again identified in the interviews. 
second, the qualitative analysis also helped to provide some suggestions as to how 
these communication and coordination issues might be addressed in the design of future 
versions of the Creative Credits scheme. economising on these (costly) brokerage elements 
had been one of the conscious design decisions made by nesta and its funding partners 
when developing the pilot. their goal had been to test the additional impact on innovation 
of the vouchers mechanism, not additional services provided to broker the relationship 
between smes and their creative suppliers. yet, a number of smes made suggestions as to 
how nesta could perhaps have provided a more active, yet still light touch, matching and 
brokerage function between smes and their creative partners.
as one sme put it (w1S9): 
“…we would have got loads more value if they went down a completely different route that was 
more online focused. Now, I think I would have made better decisions if I had have had almost 
somebody from NESTA to bounce ideas off first rather than me ... because it was quite limited 
and I think, perhaps, even if there was some sort of almost a network, an open day so – that 
everyone that was accepted onto the programme could actually go and meet a few of these 
other companies … I think that would have been a lot better. It would have meant I would get 
heaps more out of the project”.
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another sme posed the challenge of negotiating the Creatives Gallery as follows: “There’s 
just so many of them, so you would almost not know where to start. So, I don’t know if 
there’s anything else that could be done to make that selection process a little bit easier or 
help guide people if there was some kind of filtering system”. other firms highlighted the 
value of more networking events and the potential value of providing smes with examplar 
case studies (w1S13). 
5.3 Implications for Innovation voucher Schemes
We have learned from the surveys that the Creative Credits mechanism was a highly 
effective way of connecting smes with creative suppliers with which they had not 
previously worked. and that the creative projects appeared to have successfully boosted 
innovation and sales growth in smes in the near term, although these benefits appeared to 
have attenuated by the time twelve months had passed. even then, most smes said that 
they expected further impacts from their projects on sales growth to be felt in future. 
the interview evidence corroborated these findings, and also shed some light on why 
there was no network or behavioural additionality after twelve months. in particular, the 
engagement with creative businesses appears in many cases to have been viewed by 
smes as a transactional relationship; Creative Credits does not seem to have succeeded 
in nudging smes into making persistent changes in their behaviour, at least insofar as it 
relates to innovation. 
arguably, the £5,000 face value of the Creative Credits (small, even by the standards 
of smes) may not have been large enough to ‘nudge’ smes into the type of behavioural 
changes envisaged in the scheme’s logic model. We note that in other eu cities and 
regions which are piloting B2B voucher schemes drawing inspiration from Creative Credits 
(eg strasbourg, salzburg, sligo and the Basque Country), the value of innovation vouchers 
appears also to be small, and future implementations of such measures may want to 
introduce an element of random variation in the value of the voucher to investigate its 
importance.
aside from the value of the Creative Credits themselves, a number of smes were also 
conscious of having made a poor choice of creative partner. the suggestion is that smes 
might have benefitted more from Creative Credits if they had been advised by nesta 
when selecting their creative partner. in other cases, once projects had started, we might 
speculate that some brokerage aimed at establishing that both the smes and their creative 
partners still had a shared understanding of what the project was trying to achieve might 
have reduced the number of unsuccessful projects. 
Future implementations of innovation voucher schemes would be well advised to adhere as 
closely as possible to an rCt+ approach, in order to establish a cumulative evidence base 
for the effectiveness of such schemes. the high levels of interest there has been in Creative 
Credits in other regions, and the interest in innovation vouchers mechanisms in general 
in countries like the uK, presents an excellent opportunity for testing further where the 
obstacles to sustained innovation impacts lie, and how the scheme’s design can be refined 
to address these.72
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despite the increasing maturity – and widespread adoption – of innovation voucher 
schemes, there remains relatively little robust evaluation of their effectiveness in the public 
domain. the evidence which is available suggests, however, that the profile of impacts and 
outcomes from Creative Credits is similar to that identified in other voucher studies. 
the first point of similarity relates to the popularity of the scheme with smes. Creative 
Credits was over–subscribed by a factor of five. in the original 2004 pilot programme in 
the netherlands, for example, there were 1,044 applications for 100 vouchers.73 likewise 
the first three waves of the nWda voucher scheme attracted 727 applications for 500 
vouchers.74 
the second point of similarity relates to network additionality and the strong catalytic 
influence of Creative Credits on the formation of new innovation partnerships with creative 
service providers. Creative Credits generated significant short–term network additionality, 
with the award of a Creative Credit increasing the likelihood that firms would undertake 
their innovation project by 84 per cent. as noted in section 4 this level of short–term 
network additionality is marginally higher than that (79.0 per cent) achieved in the pilot 
innovation voucher scheme in the netherlands.75 evaluations of the swiss and austrian 
innovation voucher schemes suggest similarly high levels of network additionality.76 
the third point of similarity between the results of Creative Credits and other innovation 
voucher schemes relates to the weakness of the longer–term behavioural outcomes from 
the scheme. a year after the end of the Creative Credits projects, we were unable to 
identify statistically significant differences in smes’ future intentions to collaborate with 
creative firms or undertake innovation. this echoes the findings in the dutch innovation 
vouchers scheme, where follow–up with participating smes after 18 months had suggested 
no evidence of persistent effects, either in the formation of new partnerships or in 
the development of new products or processes.77 one possible reason for the lack of 
longer term effects suggested in relation to the austrian and swiss innovation voucher 
evaluations, was the small size of many voucher recipients and the difficulty which they 
had in establishing follow–up partnerships. this is consistent with a key suggestion from 
our qualitative research, namely that the benefits might be more sustained if some form 
of brokerage can be provided which supports the relationship between smes and their 
creative suppliers.
the absence of an existing rigorous evidence base for innovation voucher schemes is 
indicative of a much wider problem. Which is that very little policy supporting business is 
subject to robust evaluation. as a result we have no reliable way of knowing if large sums 
of public money are being wasted. Creative Credits - the focus of this report - is a policy 
innovation in itself, in using the innovative strengths of creative businesses to enhance 
innovation in smes. But the research method we have used may be even more important, 
in using randomization to establish the scheme’s additionality and longitudinal data to 
identify its long-term impact. We believe this approach should be used much more widely. 
at a time when public resources are scarce it’s more important than ever that we find 
out what works and what doesn’t - and that principle should apply as much to business 
support as it does to programmes in healthcare or schools where the Government has so 
far shown much greater interest.78
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Annex 1: 
ImPlEmENTATION  
ANd EvAluATION
A1.1 Implementation
Creative Credits was piloted as a regional experiment in the manchester City region 
(mCr). the manchester independent economic review (mier) had previously 
investigated creativity and innovation in the mCr and found that large numbers of 
creative firms, while well connected to firms outside the City region, were poorly 
integrated into local supply chain networks.79 the mier had therefore argued that there 
may be large and immediate payoffs to innovation if creative businesses could be better 
integrated into its supply chain networks. in the mCr, Creative Credits operated alongside 
the north West development agency’s own established innovation voucher scheme 
which, like traditional innovation voucher schemes, focused primarily on knowledge 
transfer between universities and smes.
150 Creative Credits were available within the manchester pilot, with an intention to 
distribute these equally between two waves. the first wave opened for applications 
in september 2009 and the second in February 2010. the scheme was promoted and 
marketed through a number of channels including a media public relations campaign, 
business networks and direct telemarketing to potential applicants. in promoting and 
advertising the scheme, care was taken to minimise self–selection biases. For example, 
the telesales companies who were telemarketing the scheme were encouraged to use a 
strictly random method in identifying which smes to call. more than two thousand firms 
made some form of enquiry about the scheme over the two waves.
online applications from smes were checked for eligibility by a nesta project manager 
before firms were randomly assigned to the ‘treatment’ group. the barriers to entry were 
low: Creative Credits was open to smes in almost any sector of the economy with the 
exceptions of primary industries and the creative industries. the eligibility criteria for 
Creative Credits had a number of further dimensions:
•	Geographical coverage – smes and creative firms had to have their main office 
located in either the City of manchester, the City of salford, stockport, tameside and 
trafford (Greater manchester south), Bolton, Bury, oldham, rochdale and Wigan 
(Greater manchester north), Congleton, macclesfield, vale royal or Warrington;
•	Size range – smes and creative firms had to have fewer than 250 employees and 
turnover of less than £46 million at the time of application; 
•	legal status – both smes and creative firms had to be either limited liability 
companies, limited liability partnerships, general partnerships (added in Wave two) or 
industrial or provident societies;
•	vAT–registered – sme applicant firms had to be registered for vat.
44   CREaTiVE CREDiTS  a randomized controlled industrial policy experiment
smes awarded a Creative Credit in the first wave were required to submit their final 
project proposal for approval by late november 2009 (Wave 2, april 2010) together with 
the name of their ‘servicer’ – i.e. the creative business who they had chosen to service 
their Creative Credit. (other creative companies on the Gallery who were not selected 
are referred to in this report as ‘non–servicers’).80 project eligibility criteria were changed 
slightly between Waves 1 and 2 to tighten the definitions of ‘innovation projects’. sme–
creative partnerships were then given five months to complete their project and the sme 
could claim the Creative Credit once they had been invoiced by their creative partner. 
smes in the first wave were required to complete their project by end–march 2010 and 
those in the second wave by mid–september 2010. 
A1.2 Evaluation
a strictly random allocation was used to avoid any systematic bias in the allocation of 
Creative Credits and provide a more robust indication of the extent of additionality of 
the instrument. the approach had previously been used to evaluate the pilot phase of 
the dutch national innovation voucher scheme.81 mixed methods and a longitudinal data 
strategy (four surveys and a rolling programme of qualitative interviews) were used to 
highlight temporal patterns in outputs and outcomes and provide deeper insights into 
causal mechanisms. 
Figure a1.1 illustrates the timeline for one of the two waves of Creative Credits in the 
manchester City region pilot and the pattern of surveys and interviews. the four surveys 
of smes in the treatment and control groups were as follows:
•	Survey 1 – a baseline survey undertaken at the time of the award of the Creative 
Credits and covering firm characteristics along with information about prior innovation 
and cooperation;
•	Survey 2 – undertaken around six months after survey 1 at a point just after the sme 
had completed its Creative Credits project. Questions related to the short–term 
impacts of the Creative Credits project and its learning effects.
•	Survey 3 – six months later related to firms’ innovation activities in the six months 
after the Creative Credits project along with their patterns of cooperation. 
•	Survey 4 – undertaken around a year after the end of the Creative Credits project 
related to the perceived impact of the project and outcomes at that point. 
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Figure A1.1: timeline for Creative Credits projects and their evaluation
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Qualitative data Collection
the sample consisted of 25 smes and their 17 Creative servicers, with 13 of the pairings 
from the first wave and 12 from the second. With the respondents’ permission, the 
interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed for analysis. 
•	in stage 1, semi–structured interviews were conducted with 25 smes and 16 Creative 
services between march and august 2010. (one creative service opted not to 
participate in the first round.)
•	in stage 2, telephone interviews were conducted with 22 smes and 14 Creative 
services between november 2010 and January 2011.
•	in stage 3, 7 smes from the qualitative sample participated in two ‘Journey making’ 
workshops that took place on 23rd march 2011.
•	in stage 4, semi–structured interviews were conducted with 19 smes and 8 Creative 
servicers between June and october 2011.
of the 19 smes interviewed at stage 4, 11 intended to continue working with their paired 
creative servicer in the future and 8 did not. 
the initial baseline survey (survey 1) was conducted immediately after the award of the 
Creative Credits. taking figures for both Wave 1 and Wave 2 together, 451 responses were 
received to the baseline survey (150 treatment, 301 control). 
attrition was evident in each survey thereafter, with response rates given in table a1.1 and 
Figure a1.1. as Figure a1.1 suggests, attrition was, unsurprisingly, worse among the control 
group as these firms had relatively little commitment to the Creative Credits initiative 
with respondent numbers by survey 4 falling to 157, 52.2 per cent of those firms initially 
responding to survey 1 (despite the use of cash incentives). in the treatment group, 
attrition was less severe, with 78.0 per cent of survey 1 respondents also responding to 
survey 4. little difference was evident in the attrition rates of the control group between 
the two waves of Creative Credits, but attrition was slightly higher among the Wave 2 
recipients of Creative Credits. 
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Table A1.1: survey response and attrition by survey, wave and recipient
 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
 No. No. No. No. % % % %
Treatment  150 136 129 117 100.0 90.7 86.0 78.0
wave 1 70 65 65 58 100.0 92.9 92.9 82.9
wave 2 80 71 64 59 100.0 88.8 80.0 73.8
 
Control  301 247 175 157 100.0 82.1 58.1 52.2
wave 1 153 119 89 79 100.0 77.8 58.2 51.6
wave 2 148 128 86 78 100.0 86.5 58.1 52.7
 
Total  451 383 304 274 100.0 84.9 67.4 60.8
wave 1 223 184 154 137 100.0 82.5 69.1 61.4
wave 2 228 199 150 137 100.0 87.3 65.8 60.1
Survey Survey
during the course of the study, considerable efforts were made to reduce attrition and 
ensure adequate response during the later surveys. surveys were conducted online using 
survey monkey with firms being contacted initially by email and then (often repeatedly) 
by telephone. small cash incentives (£30) were also paid to firms in the control group to 
encourage their continued participation in the project. in survey 2, for example, 167 of the 
247 control businesses responding to the survey were incentivized in this way.
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Figure A1.1: survey responses and attrition by survey and type of respondent
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Given the attrition in the proportion of respondents to each of the four surveys, it is of 
considerable interest to consider whether the longitudinal sample – i.e. those firms which 
responded to all four surveys – was typical of the whole group of initial respondents. 
table a1.2 therefore compares the characteristics at the time of survey 1 of firms 
responding to survey 1 (and possibly also surveys 2 and/or 3) but not survey 4 and firms 
responding to the whole series of four surveys. respondent numbers are given in the 
table as well as t–statistics for the equality of means between the two groups. 
reassuringly, for both the treatment and control groups, the basic characteristics 
and innovative behaviours of the longitudinal sample and firms dropping out of data 
collection were not statistically different (though for the control group there is weak 
evidence that firms in the longitudinal sample were significantly more likely to be 
engaging in new to the market innovation). 
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 N Responded Responded t–statistic Signif. 
  to Survey  to all Four   
  1 not 4 Surveys
A. Treatment 
 
limited company 117/33 84.8 90.6 0.83 0.41
Family business 68/17 41.2 57.4 1.18 0.25
Exporting firm 116/33 30.3 39.7 1.00 0.32
Internal R&d 113/31 54.8 69.9 1.50 0.14
External R&d 114/28 25.0 21.9 –0.33 0.74
Innovation  113/32 78.1 79.6 0.18 0.86
Radical innovation 83/20 55.0 55.4 0.03 0.97
 
B. Control
limited company 157/144 91.0 94.9 1.32 0.19
Family business 78/74 36.5 46.2 1.21 0.23
Exporting firm 150/134 37.3 31.3 –1.06 0.29
Internal R&d 151/138 75.4 79.5 0.83 0.41
External R&d 150/138 32.6 36.0 0.60 0.55
Innovation  148/135 74.8 75.0 0.04 0.97
Radical innovation 106/98 50.0 62.3 1.77* 0.08
Table A1.2: Characteristics of all respondents and the longitudinal sample
Notes: sample numbers in first column relate to respondents to survey 1 and 4/survey 1 and not survey 4. 
differences in response numbers reflect those respondents not answering particular questions and those selecting 
the (‘don’t know’) response. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per 
cent level.
one other comparison we consider relates to the starting characteristics of the control 
and treatment groups. as allocation between these groups was the result of a lottery, we 
would expect no systematic differences between the characteristics of the two groups, 
other than in whether or not they received a Creative Credit. 
But it is important to test for this when there are small samples of firms. We do this in two 
ways: by comparing the characteristics of the control and treatment firms responding to 
survey 1; and, restricting this comparison to the longitudinal sample of smes (table a1.3). 
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Based on the group of survey 1 respondents, we do in fact see three significant 
differences between respondents in the treatment and control groups: treatment firms 
were more likely to be family firms, and were less likely to be engaged in internal and 
external r&d (table a1.3 part a). 
For the longitudinal sample, we see a similar picture in terms of firms’ r&d activity (table 
a1.3 part B). 
Table A1.3: Characteristics of all treatment and control firms–all survey 1 
respondents and longitudinal sample.
 N Treatment Control t–statistic Signif. 
 
A. whole group of respondents 
 
limited company 150/301 89.33 93.02 –1.26 0.21
Family business 85/152 54.12 41.45 1.88* 0.06
Exporting firm 149/284 37.58 34.15 .70 0.48
Internal R&d 144/289 66.67 77.51 –2.33** 0.02
External R&d 142/288 22.54 34.38 –2.63*** 0.01
Innovation  145/283 79.31 74.91 1.04 0.30
Radical innovation 103/204 55.34 56.37 –.17 0.86
 
B. longitudinal sample
limited company 117/157 90.60 94.90 –1.33 0.18
Family business 68/78 57.35 46.15 1.35 0.18
Exporting firm 116/150 39.66 31.33 1.40 0.16
Internal R&d 113/151 69.91 79.47 –1.76* 0.08
External R&d 114/150 21.93 36.00 –2.54*** 0.01
Innovation  113/148 79.65 75.00 .89 0.37
Radical innovation 83/106 55.42 62.26 –.94 0.35
Notes: sample numbers in first column relate to treatment/Control. differences in response numbers reflect 
those respondents not answering particular questions and those selecting the (‘don’t know’) response. * denotes 
significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
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as the treatment group was less likely to have engaged in r&d than the control group, 
and as r&d should be positively linked to innovation, we might anticipate that future 
innovation is also lower among the treatment group. other things equal, comparisons 
of treatment and control groups are therefore, if anything, likely to understate the true 
impact of the Creative Credits scheme.
A1.3 The qualitative research process 
data analysis in the qualitative elements of the study was guided by a grounded theory 
methodology.82 Within this methodology, substantive concepts emerged from the data 
following the constant comparison of questionnaires, interviews and observations aligned 
to the research questions. abstraction from these data was done using an emergent 
approach where the data were interrogated for themes and trends. the identification of 
themes from each round of analysis was then used to direct and focus the next round of 
data collection providing theoretical sampling. the longitudinal aspect of the qualitative 
interviews, informed by the surveys, provided opportunities to confront the emerging 
theory with further data, and move towards the theoretical saturation that the grounded 
theory method requires. 
our justification for using a mixed–methods approach was that it enabled triangulation, 
complementarity and facilitation of the research findings.83 
By triangulation, we mean the corroboration and cross–checking of results between the 
rCt and the qualitative research. For example, by stage 4 of the evaluation, both the 
qualitative and quantitative findings pointed to the transactional nature of the impact 
on innovations in many smes. two types of triangulation, by data and by investigator,84 
supported the emerging findings by corroborating amongst different sources of data.85 
data triangulation was applied to the different sources of data collected from the smes 
and the Creative servicers. this was achieved by looking for corroboration between 
what each sme said in their interviews compared with what the Creative servicers had 
reported. When conflict in the data arose, attention was given to establish why there was 
a disconnect between what the parties were saying. 
in the investigator triangulation, the results from analyzing the interview transcripts 
were compared between two researchers to ensure themes being identified were not 
corrupted by investigator bias.86 
Complementarity allowed us to draw on insights from the qualitative work that reinforced 
the quantitative findings as these emerged. Facilitation was used in the ‘Journey making’ 
focus group to support further development of the surveys to ask respondents what they 
thought that we should be probing in the survey questions. 
the grounded theory method provided us with the techniques to develop new theory 
through inductive enquiry. in–depth interviews allowed us to explore perceptions and 
meanings, and to probe firms in more detail than would have been possible in quantitative 
surveys alone.87 
topics covered included: company background, strategy, the nature of the Creative 
Credits project, the experience of working with a creative company, communication, 
innovation, creativity, learning and intellectual property. all respondents agreed to be 
51   CREaTiVE CREDiTS  a randomized controlled industrial policy experiment
taped and their interviews were transcribed. this allowed us to analyse the data in its 
totality several times after the interviews.88 
in our data analysis we combined a manual approach and a software–supported approach 
using nvivo 7.0. We initially conducted some content analysis by coding for predefined 
topics.89 moreover, our use of grounded theory enabled codes to ‘emerge’ from the data, 
which helped prevent the researchers from missing issues of importance through having a 
predefined structure. 
a concern with nvivo is that the way it structures analysis could lead to imposing fixed 
hierarchical conceptualisations on the data, which may not be appropriate for structuring 
the analysis.90 Whilst the nvivo 7.0 software was used because of its data management 
efficiency, the researchers immersed themselves in the transcripts and manually coded 
prior to comparing the coding to check if anything had been missed through this 
hierarchical structuring process. this helps to address Bryman’s91 critique of grounded 
theory that coding involves taking small fragments of text from the data which may lead 
to the loss of contextual information.
through a process of open coding, the researchers went through each transcript to 
identify concepts and properties. Here, anything that appeared relevant (e.g. concepts 
such as innovation, creativity, strategy, processes, communication, creative project 
experiences/issues, intellectual property, etc.) was coded into common categories. 
By way of illustration, anything relating to scheduling problems was coded under the 
heading ‘time issues’ and manually as ‘time lag in delivery’.
in a separate stage of axial coding, the higher–level categories were built from groups 
of several categories from the open coding. this enabled relationships between the 
categories to emerge. For example, the ‘time issues’ code (from above) was grouped 
under a high–level category called ‘project problems’. through this process, for example, 
the code identified as ‘time lag in delivery’ was related to ‘breakdown in trust’.
in the final stage, selective coding, categories were refined until clear relationships 
between them were identified, leading to the development of a theory about the data. 
this stage merged similar/overlapping categories together and removed duplication. 
this led to the production of a refined tree structure of categories, which enabled the 
identification of important themes. For example, the relationship category of valuing 
creativity was selected as ‘creativity transfer’.
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Annex 2: 
PROFIlING CREATIvE  
CREdITS APPlICANTS
A2.1 Introduction 
the external validity of the Creative Credits experiment depends in part on the 
representativeness of the control and treatment samples compared with the target 
population. to compare Creative Credits applicants to, for example, the wider population 
of smes in the manchester City region (mCr) we conducted an external benchmark 
survey. the intention was to construct a sampling frame which matched Creative Credits’ 
eligibility criteria and applicant profile, and then (randomly) select a sample of around 
500 firms for a postal survey. 
A2.2 Non–applicants survey
the sampling frame for the group of non–applicants to the Creative Credits scheme was 
taken from the list of registered companies which forms the Fame database (accessed 
on 14th april 2010).92 the list of potential companies to survey was developed to match 
as closely as possible the eligibility criteria for Creative Credits by location, size, sector 
and legal status. one element of the eligibility criteria for Creative Credits which was less 
easy to match within Fame related to the required vat registration of eligible businesses. 
Here, we limit the sampling frame to firms which employ 3 or more people to minimise 
the probability of sampling non–vat registered firms, though we could not guarantee that 
some non vat–registered smes were surveyed. 
this gave an in–scope sampling frame of 4,200 companies, of which a number were 
excluded due to incomplete contact details, from which a random sample of 500 firms 
was selected. Firms in the sample were sent a postal questionnaire at broadly the same 
time as the baseline survey of Wave two. a response rate of around 13 per cent was 
finally obtained suggesting a sampling error of around ±6 per cent. some care is therefore 
necessary in the interpretation of comparisons between the applicant group and survey 
results for the wider population of firms. 
A2.3 Characteristics of Creative Credits Applicants 
amongst Creative Credits applicants the sectors with greatest representation were 
services businesses and, in particular: Consultancy, professional services, General 
Business services and retail. no applications were received from the medical sectors. 
applicants were widely dispersed geographically.93 the turnover of the applicant group 
varied relatively widely, although over half of all applicants had an annual turnover of less 
than £500,000. Within this group, one–fifth of all applicants reported that their turnover 
was less than £100,000 per year.94
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Comparing the group of Creative Credits applicants to the eligible population of 
companies in mCr provides an indication of the penetration of the scheme. using data 
from Companies House, we estimate that there were around 4,200 eligible firms in the 
mCr of which 672 or around 1:6 control for Creative Credits. applications were not, 
however, evenly spread across the firm size range with micro firms and firms with more 
than 50 employees under–represented in the group of Creative Credits applicants and 
firms with 10–50 employees significantly over–represented. Compared to the overall 
application proportion of 1:6, this meant that for the individual sizebands the scheme 
penetration was: 1:8 for micro firms with fewer than 10 employees; 1:2 for firms with 10–50 
employees and 1:16 for smes with more than 50 employees. 
Comparing the characteristics of Creative Credits applicants using the baseline survey 
and non–applicants from the non–applicants survey suggests: 
•	Creative Credits applicants were less likely to be exporting than the broader 
population of eligible firms. 
•	Creative Credits applicants were significantly more likely to have a high proportion 
of graduate employees (more than 40 per cent of the workforce) than the broader 
population of eligible firms. this partly reflects the disproportionate number of 
applicant firms in the (graduate–intensive) business services sector. 
•	Creative Credits applicants were much more active users of a wide range of external 
business support organizations than the broader population of eligible firms. despite 
the broad–based nature of the scheme’s marketing, it seems likely that these linkages 
encouraged firms to apply for Creative Credits.
•	Creative Credits applicants were significantly more likely to have engaged in 
prior innovation than firms in the broader eligible population. in particular, around 
three–quarters of Creative Credits applicants reported having introduced product 
innovations in the previous three years compared with only 42.9 per cent of non–
applicants. 
•	Forty–two per cent of Creative Credits applicants who had undertaken prior 
innovation had previous experience of working with creative service providers, 
compared with only 20 per cent of non–applicants. 
in general terms, this suggests that Creative Credits applicants were more focused 
on innovation than non–applicants, more likely to have worked with external partners 
(including Creative servicers) and to have had higher skill levels. 
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Annex 3: 
PROFIlING CREATIvE  
CREdITS PROjECTS
in this annex we profile the projects which were supported by the Creative Credits pilot. 
the main characteristics of the Creative Credits projects are summarized in table a3.1 
based on the main focus of the project undertaken. 
By far the most common theme was the upgrading and development of firms’ websites, 
with marketing and video production significantly less common. Fairly typical among the 
website development projects were the following project outlines taken from the original 
project proposals:
“Bring site from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0. Accessibility for all users. Enhance the capability 
for SEO on the site. CMS system to manage content and images, giving a better level 
of control than previously. To create an outstanding website by delivering a cutting–
edge design to encourage the viewer to remain on the site and purchase services as 
well as view the site as a valuable source of information, encouraging repeat visits to 
the site and grow the strong reputation the company already enjoys”. 
“To rebrand the company, to design new fonts and design for the name …. To design 
a new logo that can be used on the website and other items. To redesign the website 
completely incorporating the new redesigned logo”.
“It is proposed to create a suite of flexible video tools to: have a brand dialogue with 
potential opinion leaders, the wider media industry and potential customers. Reinforce 
the positive outcomes of the service. Highlight [our company] as leaders in this 
industry. The resulting video content would be used at trade shows, in proposals to 
clients and on the company website”.
“Produce informative and educational video targeting professionals and laymen … 
What, How, Why format using state–of–the–art mixed media techniques. Create fresh, 
dynamic content demystifying the science and technologies”. 
“Four or five short funny videos set for viral release to raise awareness of [our 
company]. The videos will form a series that will be seeded according to the target 
market and sent out at regular intervals as part of a creative marketing campaign. 
There is scope for the series to be continued, potentially encouraging viewers/
customers to submit their own videos or ideas with the best ones being made”.
in survey 1, the creative businesses servicing Creative Credits were asked how the 
Creative Credits projects had come about, and how these projects related to their other 
business. in the majority of cases (66 per cent), the initial contact that had led to their 
creative commission was made by the sme. in around a third of cases, the initial approach 
was made by the creative business. almost 55 per cent of Creative servicers reported 
working with an sme which was in a different sector to their usual clients, and over 41 per 
cent described the sme as being outside their usual business networks.95
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Table A3.1: Breakdown of all Creative Credits projects 
 Number of projects Percentage of projects 
 including this as primary 
 or secondary goal
web 81 60%
marketing 14 11%
video 13 10%
Brand development 10 9%
logo 8 8%
Publication 8 15%
PR Campaign 6 5%
market Research 2 1%
New media (iPhone App) 1 1%
Product design 1 1%
Total 144
Note: in six of the projects there were a range of objectives making it difficult to identify clear primary or 
secondary goals.
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Annex 4: 
ECONOmETRIC TABlES 
in this annex, we include a series of regression analyses underlying the findings reported 
in different parts of the main text. in each case models relate output and outcome 
variables to a set of independent variables measured in the baseline survey at the time 
the Creative Credits were awarded. the tables are as follows:
table a4.1 reports probit models for the probability of receiving a Creative Credit. as 
expected given the random allocation of Creative Credits there are few variables that are 
statistically significant, and where there are any these simply reflect small sample biases 
and have no economic significance. model 2 in this table is used to derive the sample 
selection correction (inverse mills ratio) in subsequent models. 
tables a4.2 and a4.3 report probit models of the probability of a project going ahead 
allowing for any selection bias. the (anticipated) insignificance of the inverse mills ratio 
in these models suggests that there is no selection bias. models in table a4.3 test the 
impact of incentives provided to encourage survey response. again these are statistically 
insignificant. 
tables a4.4 and a4.5 report probit models of the probability of undertaking product, 
process and new to the market innovation after six and twelve months respectively. table 
a4.6 reports tobit models of the impact of the Creative Credits on the sales growth 
distribution of the treatment and control groups six and twelve months after the end 
of the project. (tobit models are used here as the dependent variable is upper and 
lower bounded due to survey questions which collected data on growth rates using a 
categorical question). tables a4.7 and a4.8 report probit models of the probability of 
undertaking other forms of innovation over the next three years measured after six and 
twelve months respectively. table a4.9 reports probit models of the probability of future 
cooperation with designers six and twelve months after the completion of the Creative 
Credits project. 
all of these models allow for potential sample selection biases.
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Notes: marginal effects are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the 
baseline survey from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; 
** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
Probit models of the probability that a firm received a Creative Credit 
 model 1 model 2 
 dy/dx dy/dx
micro or new firm  –0.066 –0.091*
Small firm (11–50 employees) 0.027 
Firm vintage (years) –0.007*** –0.006***
Firm member of wider group  0.027 
Family–owned company  0.103 
Business services company  –0.044 
manufacturing company 0.052 
Transport services company 0.089 
Retail or wholesale business 0.087 
Non–executive directors 0.053 
Firm has formal business plan –0.071 –0.092*
Firm is an exporter  0.012 
Firm has more than 20% graduates 0.028 
Firm was innovator in last 3 years 0.039 
Number of observations 383 432
Equation χ2 19.17 13.448
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.025
Table A4.1: probit models of the probability of receiving a Creative Credit 
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Probit models of the probability that the project would have gone ahead with and without 
sample selection term 
 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 
 dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Employment one year ago –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002
Firm member of wider group  –0.172 –0.170 –0.173 –0.170
Business services company  –0.091 –0.078 –0.087 –0.074
manufacturing company –0.112 –0.077 –0.112 –0.078
Other services company  0.089 0.121 0.086 0.118
Transport services company –0.058 –0.048 –0.036 –0.029
Retail or wholesale business 0.142 0.178 0.142 0.177
Non–executive directors 0.148 0.166 0.137 0.155
Family–owned company  –0.052 –0.061 –0.067 –0.074
Firm has formal business plan –0.103 –0.099 –0.122 –0.116
Firm is an exporter  0.090  0.085 
Firm has more than 20% graduates 0.079 0.085 0.086 0.09
Firm was innovator in last 3 years –0.089 –0.084 –0.079 –0.075
Creative Credit recipient  0.862*** 0.860*** 0.864*** 0.861***
Inverse mills Ratio –0.181 –0.161
  
Number of observations 382 382 382 382
Equation χ2 287.72 286.414 287.008 285.833
Pseudo R2 0.570 0.567 0.568 0.566
Table A4.2: probit models of project continuation with and without selection   
 controls
Notes: marginal effects are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the 
baseline survey from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; 
** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
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Probit models of the probability that the project would have gone ahead with and without 
sample selection term and allowing for incentive payments
 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 
 dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Employment one year ago –0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002
Firm member of wider group  –0.173 –0.170 –0.173 –0.170
Business services company  –0.091 –0.078 –0.087 –0.074
manufacturing company –0.109 –0.075 –0.109 –0.075
Other services company  0.090 0.121 0.086 0.118
Transport services company –0.052 –0.043 –0.031 –0.024
Retail or wholesale business 0.142 0.178 0.141 0.177
Non–executive directors 0.146 0.164 0.134 0.153
Family–owned company  –0.054 –0.063 –0.07 –0.077
Firm has formal business plan –0.101 –0.097 –0.12 –0.115
Firm is an exporter  0.091  0.086 
Firm has more than 20% graduates 0.080 0.086 0.087 0.091
Firm was innovator in last 3 years –0.089 –0.084 –0.079 –0.075
Creative Credit recipient  0.865*** 0.862*** 0.867*** 0.864***
Inverse mills Ratio –0.180 –0.159  
Incentive payment to firm  0.020 0.017 0.022 0.019 
Number of observations 382 382 382 382
Equation χ2 287.782 286.457 287.082 285.889
Pseudo R2 0.570 0.567 0.568 0.566
Table A4.3: probit models of project continuation with and without selection   
 allowing for incentive payments
Notes: marginal effects are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the 
baseline survey from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; 
** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
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Probit models of the probability of innovation six months after the end of the Creative 
Credits project allowing for sample selection
 Product/ New to the  Process  
 service market Innovation 
 innovation innovation
 b/se b/se b/se
Employment one year ago 0.000 –0.001 0.001
Firm member of wider group  0229*** 0.119 0.063
Business services company  –0.057 0.167 0.006
manufacturing company 0.122 0.253 0.117
Other services company  -0.046 0.029 0.040
Transport services company 0.047  0.093
Retail or wholesale business 0.195** 0.134 0.090
Non–executive directors 0.084 0.103 0.049
Family–owned company  -0.165** -0.182** -0.017
Firm has formal business plan 0.028 -0.018 0.107
Firm is an exporter  0.019 -0.091 -0.066
Firm has more than 20% graduates 0.106 0.002 0.186**
Firm was innovator in last 3 years 0.219** 0.112 0.101
Creative Credit recipient  0.132** 0.140* 0.195***
Inverse mills Ratio 0.314* -0.016 0.100 
Number of observations 228 175 209
Equation χ2 34.472 16.739 19.95
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.076 0.069
Table A4.4: probit models of the probability of innovation after six months
Notes: marginal effects are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the 
baseline survey from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; 
** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
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Probit models of the probability of innovation six months after the end of the Creative 
Credits project allowing for sample selection
 Product/ New to the  Process  
 service market Innovation 
 innovation innovation
 b/se b/se b/se
Employment one year ago –0.001 0.001 0.000
Firm member of wider group  0.058 0.156 0.092
Business services company  -0.028 0.073 -0.120
manufacturing company 0.016 0.070 -0.115
Other services company  0.111 0.106 -0.034
Transport services company -0.06 -0.269** 0.183
Retail or wholesale business -0.035 0.119 0.089
Non–executive directors 0.035 0.016 -0.086
Family–owned company  -0.046 -0.11 -0.105
Firm has formal business plan 0.220*** 0.102 0.073
Firm has more than 20% graduates 0.167** 0.072 0.153**
Firm was innovator in last 3 years 0.054 0.150* 0.271***
Creative Credit recipient  0.097 0.127* -0.025
Inverse mills Ratio -0.103 0.07 -0.032 
Number of observations 230 199 222
Equation χ2 27.213 25.124 23.261
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.097 0.076
Table A4.5: probit models of the probability of innovation after 12 months
Notes: marginal effects are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the 
baseline survey from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; 
** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
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Notes: Coefficients are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the baseline 
survey from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 
per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
Tobit models of the impact of Creative Credits on the distribution of sales growth rates after 
6 and 12 months allowing for sample selection
 After six months After 12 months 
 Coefficients Coefficients
Employment one year ago –0.053 0.003
Firm member of wider group  –4.870 –1.156
Business services company  2.498 –0.352
manufacturing company 1.857 –3.260
Other services company  –3.959 –5.274
Transport services company 6.556 1.753
Retail or wholesale business 3.410 1.495
Non–executive directors 2.075 –4.180
Family–owned company  –0.879 1.582
Firm has formal business plan 2.087 7.164**
Firm is an exporter  0.684 0.949
Firm has more than 20% graduates 4.269* 6.955***
Firm was innovator in last 3 years 2.076 –0.171
Creative Credit recipient  0.370 3.530
Inverse mills Ratio –2.598 –3.612
Constant term 1.602 0.286 
  
Number of observations 211 225
Equation χ2 14.662 18.757
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.012
Table A4.6: tobit models of the impact on sales growth after 6 and 12 months 
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Probit models of the likelihood that the firm would undertake innovation in the next three years, 
measured six months after the end of the Creative Credits projects, with sample selection term. 
 Goods or  Processes Strategy New tech– Organi– marketing 
 services   nologies sation
 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 
 dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx
Employment one year ago 0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.003 –0.001 0.000
Firm member of wider group  –0.168 –0.073 –0.265* –0.078 –0.061 
Business services company  0.060 0.046 0.043 –0.055 –0.071 –0.021
manufacturing company 0.029 0.042* 0.069 0.149 0.035 –0.040
Other services company   –0.011 –0.154 –0.028 –0.127 –0.264
Transport services company    0.071 0.148 –0.032
Retail or wholesale business  0.048** 0.061 –0.058 0.024 –0.010
Non–executive directors  0.028 0.045 0.004 0.033 –0.009
Family–owned company  0.014 0.045** 0.031 0.022 0.092 0.009
Firm has formal business plan –0.001 0.036 –0.029 0.084 0.162* 0.057
Firm is an exporter  –0.005 –0.023 –0.057 0.013 –0.053 –0.006
Firm has more than 20% graduates 0.051 0.022 0.032 –0.048 0.038 0.057
Firm was innovator in last 3 years 0.064 0.129* 0.115 0.107 0.033 0.075
Creative Credit recipient  0.026 –0.012 0.004 –0.060 –0.072 0.001
Inverse mills Ratio 0.095 0.014 –0.044 –0.278 –0.217 0.068
 
Number of observations 126 193 185 171 182 176
Equation χ2 11.263 22.748 20.31 15.148 10.315 11.564
Pseudo R2 0.208 0.227 0.15 0.066 0.042 0.118
Table A4.7: probit models of likelihood of innovation over the next three years after 6 months  
 with selection
Notes: marginal effects are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the baseline survey 
from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at 
the 1 per cent level. 
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Probit models of the likelihood that the firm would undertake innovation in the next three years, 
measured twelve months after the end of the Creative Credits projects, with sample selection term.
 Goods or  Processes Strategy New tech– Organi– marketing 
 services   nologies sation
 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6 
 dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
 b/se b/se b/se
Employment one year ago 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 –0.001 0.001
Firm member of wider group   0.052 0.014 0.148 0.126 
Business services company  –0.004 –0.052 –0.042 –0.015 0.023 0.043
manufacturing company  –0.025 0.047 0.211 0.082 –0.003
Other services company  –0.053 –0.136 –0.183 –0.039 –0.111 0.022
Transport services company –0.047 –0.095 –0.061 0.184 0.269 –0.022
Retail or wholesale business 0.044 0.033 –0.036 –0.072 0.125 0.033
Non–executive directors –0.024 0.011 0.050 0.188* 0.189* –0.045
Family–owned company  –0.021 0.031 0.060 –0.056 0.047 0.107*
Firm has formal business plan 0.061 0.017 0.113* 0.074 0.116 0.165**
Firm is an exporter  0.024 0.001 –0.039 0.015 0.124 0.118*
Firm has more than 20% graduates 0.051 0.036 0.037 0.072 0.043 0.064
Firm was innovator in last 3 years 0.149* 0.164** 0.064 0.117 0.131 0.081
Creative Credit recipient  –0.020 –0.016 –0.052 0.115 0.000 0.054
Inverse mills Ratio 0.016 –0.133 –0.082 0.152 0.040 0.150
 
Number of observations 155 216 207 170 185 176
Equation χ2 12.161 17.246 16.847 20.769 19.834 18.058
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.121 0.088 0.088 0.077 0.103
Table A4.8: probit models of firms’ likelihood of innovation over the next three years after 12  
 months with selection
Notes: marginal effects are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the baseline survey 
from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; ** at 5 per cent and *** at 
the 1 per cent level. 
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Notes: marginal effects are reported. sample sizes differ due to missing responses to some questions in the 
baseline survey from which the independent variables are derived. * denotes significance at the 10 per cent level; 
** at 5 per cent and *** at the 1 per cent level. 
Probit models of the probability of future innovation cooperation with designers allowing for 
sample selection
 After six months After 12 months 
 dy/dx dy/dx
Employment one year ago 0.002 0.001
Firm member of wider group  0.058 0.053
Business services company  –0.081 0.046
manufacturing company 0.032 0.067
Other services company  –0.042 –0.018
Transport services company  0.035
Retail or wholesale business 0.088 0.018
Non–executive directors –0.172* –0.009
Family owned company  0.128*** 0.057
Firm has formal business plan –0.028 0.035
Firm is an exporter  –0.017 0.009
Firm has more than 20% graduates 0.048 0.035
Firm was innovator in last 3 years 0.056 0.005
Creative Credit recipient  –0.029 0.049
Inverse mills Ratio 0.439** 0.149
  
Number of observations 193 210
Equation χ2 24.09 5.46
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.03
Table A4.9: modelling the probability of future cooperation with designers 
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Annex 5: 
ESTImATING ThE BENEFIT–COST 
RATIO FOR CREATIvE CREdITS 
as part of survey 2 – immediately at the end of the Creative Credits project – and in 
survey 4, 12 months after the end of the Creative Credits project, firms in the treatment 
group were asked to provide their own estimate of the impact of their Creative Credits 
project on their sales. these should be viewed as an indirect estimate of the sales 
impacts at best, because they are based on self–reported impacts, as compared with the 
difference between reported overall sales in the treatment and control group of smes. 
nonetheless, insofar as identifying the separate impact of Creative Credits from other 
influences on overall sales is necessarily challenging, these impacts may contain some 
information.
smes put their mean impact on sales at £2,900 at the end of their projects and a further 
£7,740 after 12 months. these estimates were subject to considerable variation, however, 
with standard deviations of £5,970 at the end of the project (implying a coefficient of 
variation of 2.03) and £8,880 after 12 months (coefficient of variation of 1.14). 
We make two observations. First, after 12 months the average addition to sales reported 
stemming from the Creative Credits project was substantially greater than the actual 
cost of the Creative Credits themselves. second, although the coefficients of variation 
suggest that additions to sales varied substantially at the end of the projects themselves 
this variation had declined markedly after 12 months. in other words, the variability in 
outcomes had declined over this period. 
marked variation across smes is also evident in the anticipated duration of the benefits 
of the Creative Credits. in survey 4 – a year after project completion – only 17.6 per cent 
of firms in the treatment group reported having already got the whole benefit from their 
Creative Credits project. the larger proportion of firms continued to see future benefits 
with some even seeing the benefits running beyond five years. on average – using mid–
points in the calculation – the average duration of benefits from Creative Credits was 2.5 
years. using this benefit duration and the benefit profile, we are able to derive an estimate 
of the Creative Credits’ benefit–cost ratio. 
on the cost side of the equation, a Creative Credit had face value £4,000 with each 
recipient required to add a minimum of an additional £1,000, totalling £5,000. in 
the event, however, the average project cost was slightly higher – £5,400 with firms 
contributing an average of £1,400 each. in terms of benefits, projects’ additional sales 
averaged £2,900 in year 1 and in the next twelve months added a further £7,740 to sales. 
this benefit was expected to continue for 2.5 years. adopting a standard annual discount 
rate of 3.5 per cent as suggested in the integrated evaluation Framework96 the benefit 
stream therefore had total sales impact of £2,900+£7,469+£7,207+ £3,478=£21,054. 
to derive a gross value added (Gva) impact figure requires a turnover/Gva ratio. For 
the whole economy in 2010 this ratio was 0.300 (aBi 2010, all industries, release date 
17/11/2011), implying a discounted total Gva of £6,316. applying the mean regional 
displacement value suggested for r&d and innovation support measures (24.5 per cent)97 
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and the average suggested regional multiplier of 1.5698 for similar schemes suggests a 
total Gva of £6,316 x 0.755 x 1.56 =£7,438. this suggests a benefit–cost ratio of 1.37.
note, however, that this benefit–cost ratio is based on an assumed persistence of benefits 
of 2.5 years derived from sme survey responses. Government best practice guidelines 
for project evaluation (the integrated evaluation Framework Guidelines) suggest instead 
a 3–year benefit duration. making this assumption and maintaining all others suggests 
a higher discounted Gva impact of £7,360. applying displacement and multiplier ratios 
to this number suggests a total regional Gva impact per case of £8,670, and a benefit–
cost ratio of 1.60. there are great uncertainties around the value of all the assumed 
parameters, so (in addition to the uncertainties surrounding impact estimates based on 
firms’ subjective assessments of project sales benefits) these impact estimates should be 
treated with especially great caution. 
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Annex 6: 
CASE STudIES 
w1S10 /w1C9 CASE STudy ONE
the project objective outlined by W1s10 in stage 1 was to improve the delivery and design 
of an e–commerce site. 
output additionality of the project was suggested by a sales increase of 75 per cent 
by the stage 2 qualitative interview, around nine months after the completion of the 
project. there were some signs of behavioural additionality, in that the sme had clearly 
recognised the business benefits of creative input (learning ‘to listen to’ rather than 
direct the process), and was more open to new ways of doing business as a result. 
network additionality was also evident through the sme’s expanded creative and supplier 
networks. the relationship between W1s10 and W1C9 itself proved short–term, as W1s10 
felt ‘they’re too expensive for us.’ W1s10 stated that, despite the positive outcomes, the 
final cost of the work with W1C9, which amounted to £15,000, was excessive. W1C9 was 
not available for interview at stage 4.
Output Additionality
By stage 2, W1s10 had experienced a jump in sales of 75 per cent. W1s10 attributed this 
directly to the improved website. However, W1s10 was unsure of the extent to which this 
increase in turnover had translated into ‘a sizeable profit’, but believed ‘we will make a 
sizeable profit next year’.
Behavioural Additionality
prior to the Creative Credits project, W1s10 had had minimal engagement with the 
creative sector, preferring to work in–house. W1C9 had won the confidence of W1s10: as 
the latter said, “I realised that I shouldn’t be leading the design…You tell him the product 
that’s going to be sold, let him decide how it looks, because otherwise, you’re not getting 
any value out of it.” By stage 4, W1s10 had outsourced all of its creative work (to creative 
companies that were less costly than W1C9) to ensure that its marketing materials were 
visually consistent. W1s10 spoke of their initial disappointment that the website had 
not been more ‘funky’, but later recognised W1C9’s skills in presenting “something that 
actually is totally right.” and how “The value came in the depth and the polished look of 
the design.”
W1s10 believed that the confidence gained from the improved website had encouraged 
them to consider “more ways of developing, ways of taking the business forward’ such as 
trading in Europe.” While W1s10 felt it was more creative and innovative as a result of the 
project, it was still careful to evaluate new ventures “…if you’re gonna jump into the void 
you’ve gotta know what the bottom line is.”
Network Additionality
W1s10 reported how exposure to the Creatives Gallery had vastly expanded their creative 
networks and introduced them to new ideas such as social media “[the area] is awash 
with creative talent, which I was not aware of.” they have since worked with several of 
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these creative companies. at stage 4, W1s10 spoke of how the new website had changed 
suppliers’ perceptions “…[previously inaccessible] brands that had come on as a result 
of the way the website looks”, expanding and improving the quality of their supplier 
network. 
Advice for SmEs working with creative suppliers
W1s10’s advice for an sme included: immerse yourself in design throughout; examine 
numerous websites, reviewing multiple creative companies and check that they have both 
design and technical capabilities. W1s10 also spoke of the need to trust the creative’s 
work as “...you can’t dictate, you have to allow them to function, to breathe and to tell you. 
That’s what they do every day.”
w1S6 /w1C6 CASE STudy TwO
W1s6 closed for business at the end of 2011. the project objective outlined by W1s6 in 
stage 1 was to create a brochure–style website for a new division that would allow a 
live portfolio to be maintained and used by future and current clients. the account that 
they gave of their Creative Credits project was positive. However, there was no evidence 
of additional sales impacts. Behavioural additionality was evident in the sme, through 
improved brand coherence and recognition of the value of creative input. there was some 
evidence that network additionality was evident in terms of a deepening relationship with 
the Creative servicer.
Output Additionality 
W1s6 felt unable to assess its Creative Credits project impact in terms of sales by stage 4. 
Behavioural Additionality
organizational learning was evident during the project. in stage 1, W1s6 viewed the 
website in purely functional terms: “we finalised the brief and got the structure of the 
site, because before they designed anything the structure was laid down.” this point 
was echoed in stage 2, when W1s6 spoke of applying their learning about the multiple 
functions of a website. By stage 4, W1s6 spoke about “the image we wanted to portray...” 
and making their marketing materials visually consistent: “...they’ve created a leaflet 
that’s based on the images in the website and the look of the website. So it’s a consistent 
marketed image...[before] They would have been separate.” W1s6 also changed its 
definition of innovation, from product–oriented in stage 1, to include the value of 
presentation in engaging new markets, and spoke of the value of using an expert to 
engage in creativity. this new visual awareness of W1s6 was also noted by W1C6 at stage 
4. W1C6, in turn, gained experience in a new industry sector and created “a new content 
management...system (which) streamlined our project timelines” specifically for the 
project, which they continued to use and develop afterwards. 
Network Additionality
W1s6 and W1C6 developed a positive business relationship through their Creative Credits 
project. this was apparent in W1s6’s confidence in W1C6’s expertise. By stage 4, W1s6 
stated “…they can see the business picture and they understand the business that we’re 
in”. plans for a website for other divisions discussed by W1s6 at stages 1, 2 and 4, did not 
materialise as “There are just other priorities to be honest.” (stage 4). W1s6 closed for 
business shortly after the stage 4 qualitative interview. 
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Advice for SmEs working with creative suppliers
at stage 4, W1s6’s advice on selecting a creative provider was “Talk to a lot of them, pick 
as many ideas as you can”, then “pick a company that when you’ve been talking to them 
they’ve been listening to what you do, not telling you what they can do”. W1C6 felt the 
key issue was for the sme to be clear what they wanted to achieve by having a website 
in order to guide the creative company and to consider “...is it actively doing anything for 
your business?” 
w1S11 /w1C10 CASE STudy ThREE
the project objective outlined by W1s11 in stage 1 was to create a website to introduce a 
new product to the marketplace. the relationship with the creative partner W1C10 got off 
to a bad start, deteriorated further, but subsequently improved. at the end of the Creative 
Credits project, the relationship appeared to have failed both because of a mismatch of 
expectations and mistakes by W1C10’s original project manager meant the website design 
proved unsuitable. 
However, W1C10 changed the website to address W1s11’s concern so that by stage 4, 
W1C10 continued to host the site. output additionality was evident through increased 
sales and expanded markets. there appears to have been some behavioural additionality 
in W1s11 through improved communication skills and an increased confidence in 
marketing. network additionality was evident through the ongoing, if shaky, relationship 
with the Creative servicer and with other creative companies, customer referrals to W1s11 
by W1C10, and a growing group of global innovation partnerships. 
Output Additionality
the manager of W1s11 explained how he had challenged W1C10 about the website: “I was 
feeling sick”. in response, W1C10 had revamped the website. By stage 2, W1s11 stated that 
the website had already “made a huge difference to our business”, increasing exposure 
and allowing global expansion. By stage 4, sales had demonstrably improved and W1s11 
attributed the increase largely to the website.
Behavioural Additionality
at stage 1, W1s11 had been unfamiliar with the creative sector, perceiving little value in 
it. By stage 4, their opinion had completely changed, and the value in the project was 
seen in it having improved communication skills and increasing W1s11’s confidence in 
marketing. W1s11 had commissioned another creative company to work on the website 
prior to the stage 4 interview. Future work with W1C10, in addition to website hosting, 
remained a possibility. W1s11 had also become highly active in social media, one of 
W1C10’s key skill sets. For their part, W1C10 had now put in place a project management 
system as well as having introduced a more formalized approach to working with clients.
Network Additionality
at stage 4, the website and social media were cited by W1s11 as having been important 
for creating new innovation development partnerships both locally and internationally. By 
stage 4, W1s11 had worked with another new creative supplier, and was also considering 
moving some creative work in–house. 
Advice for SmEs working with creative suppliers
W1s11 was concerned that the creative companies had not been vetted prior to going on 
the Creatives Gallery. W1s11’s advice on selecting a creative provider was to check out their 
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references then select on ‘that kind of instinct where it tells you, “I’m talking to the right person 
here”.’ W1C10 felt that most of the smes did not understand that within the creative industries, 
work is paid mostly up front and that fees are exclusive of vat. this confusion had led to cash–
flow issues and delayed payments, and thus a poor initial working relationship. W1C10 suggested 
that in any future scheme the creative companies be paid directly by nesta.
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